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Summary 
This paper asks what regulation actually means in practice in the post-economic reform context of India, 
taking the case of biosafety regulation and Bt cotton as a case. The last few years have been a test case for 
such regulations, culminating in the formal approval of Bt cotton for commercial production in 2002. The 
paper explores various dimensions of regulation – narrow and broad, “front end” and “back end”, 
technical and political. With the opening up of the economy and the encouragement of external 
investment in areas like biotechnology, biosafety regulation is one area retained by the central state. But 
how effective is this, given the role of powerful commercial players and the highly diverse set of practices 
found at more local, state levels? By examining the Bt cotton story in India – and in Karnataka state in 
particular – the paper demonstrates how – in practice – regulations emerge through a political process of 
negotiation between a wide range of actors in multiple sites. The result is usually an uneven, and often 
diverse, compromise, based on a combination of technical, social, political and, sometimes, moral 
considerations. It is the process of co-construction of policy, operating in a hybrid world between science, 
business and policy which is key for our understanding of regulation in practice. A particular focus of this 
paper is the interaction between national and state level processes in the Indian federal system, and an 
examination of how regulatory debates – formally located at the national level within national ministries 
and departments, firmly within the Delhi policy circuit – influence and, in turn, are influenced by what 
happens at a state level. Across these sites – all under the banner of “Bt cotton” – a number of quite 
different debates are being had: over the efficacy of the technology; over the changing nature of 
agriculture; over the control of agriculture and food by multinationals; over the role of the state in a 
federal system; over the relevance of regulation in a post-reform economy, and so on. Different actors, 
deploying different narratives about regulatory policy, join up with different allies at different times. There 
is no simple story. Yet the sheer complexity of the policy process, and the way this is embedded in the 
political and social fabric of India, is revealing and important for any discussion about what appropriate 
policy responses might be to the regulatory dilemmas presented by agricultural biotechnology in the 
developing world. Despite the advocacy of uniformity and harmonisation in regulatory policy, this paper 
shows how there clearly can be no one-size-fits-all solution.  
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 1  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with how biosafety regulations work in practice in the Indian context. The last 
few years have been a test case for such regulations, culminating in the formal approval of Bt cotton for 
commercial production in 2002. The paper explores various dimensions of regulation – narrow and broad, 
“front end” and “back end”, technical and political – and asks what regulation actually means in the post-
economic reform context of India. With the opening up of the economy and the encouragement of 
external investment in areas like biotechnology, biosafety regulation is one area retained by the central 
state. But how effective is this, given the role of powerful commercial players and the highly diverse set of 
practices found at more local, state levels?  
By examining the Bt cotton story in India – and in Karnataka state in particular – the paper explores 
the validity of different views of regulation. One view would claim a simple, rational, science-based 
process, whereby guidelines developed centrally by experts are enshrined in law and implemented by 
bureaucrats with the assent of politicians. An alternative perspective, though, and one that the evidence 
presented in this paper would support, posits that regulations emerge through a political process of 
negotiation between a wide range of actors, in multiple sites. The result is usually an uneven, and often 
diverse, compromise, based on a combination of technical, social, political and, sometimes, moral 
considerations. In such a view, it is the process of co-construction of regulatory policy, operating in a 
hybrid world between science, business and policy which is key. 
Since 1989, biotechnology regulatory policy has emerged in an incremental, some would say 
haphazard, way, prompted by a variety of factors and influenced by a range of different actors, both 
within and outside the formal regulatory arena. The debates over the approval of Bt cotton, in particular, 
offer a useful lens through which to look at the emergence of regulatory policy in practice. The Bt cotton 
debate exemplifies the tensions between the attempted maintenance of a rational, technical, science-based 
stand focused on issues of risks and potential impacts – where technical and political issues are deemed to 
be wholly separated – and a more explicitly social and political perspective, which sees the debate as part 
of a wider discussion about the future of agriculture, technology and society more broadly.1 
The Bt cotton debate also highlights the tensions between different actors – between the public and 
private sectors, between agriculturalists and new biologists, between arms of the central and state-level 
bureaucratic machinery, between the Union government and the states, and between formal governmental 
                                                 
1  While these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive they do highlight an important contrast between a 
“back end” risk/impact focus and a “front end” technology choice/societal priority focus. Regulatory 
arrangements may cover both aspects, but most efforts – including the very significant investments in donor 
supported “capacity building” efforts by such agencies as USAID, UNEP/GEF, OECD and others – tend to 
focus on “back end” risk approaches, emphasising impacts on biosafety, and especially health and 
environmental impacts. The wider issues, such as the socio-economic and political consequences of adopting a 
particular technology trajectory are, as a consequence, left out of the picture. Thus, the framing of the 
regulatory debate is key. If it is kept narrow, science-focused and risk oriented, then key elements of the debate 
are not on the table. If it is broadened and made more inclusive, then the remit of regulatory deliberations 
widens, with a range of consequences for who participates, what expertises are required and so on. The way 
such debates are framed internationally, and what “capacity building” support is made available as a result has a 
major impact on the way regulatory processes are designed and played out in the developing world (see Newell 
2002; Scoones 2002a for a discussion of these issues). 
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 authorities and a range of different “civil society” players. As the discussion in the paper shows, these 
groupings are not watertight, nor are the tensions uniformly played out. Indeed, a close examination of the 
Bt cotton controversy reveals a much more complex scenario than often suggested. Under the banner of 
“Bt cotton” a number of quite different debates are being had: over the efficacy of the technology; over 
the changing nature of agriculture; over the control of agriculture and food by multinationals; over the 
role of the state in a federal system; over the relevance of regulation in a post-reform economy, and so on.  
Different actors, deploying different narratives about regulatory policy, join up with different allies at 
different times. There is no simple story. Yet the sheer complexity of the policy process, and the way this 
is embedded in the political and social fabric of India, is revealing and important for the any discussion 
about what appropriate policy responses might be to the dilemmas presented by agricultural 
biotechnology in the developing world. There is no one-size-fits-all solution clearly. As the paper reveals 
the story is played out in very different ways in New Delhi, Bangalore and Haveri district in Karnataka. A 
responsive, adaptive, politically attuned, and thoroughly embedded regulatory process is required, one that 
must emerge organically from the settings it is supposed to serve. What the Bt cotton story in India tells us 
loud and clear is that a simplistic, imposed, technical regulatory formula – along the lines so often touted 
by development agencies in “capacity building” exercises in response to the Cartagena protocol – simply 
will not work.  
The paper therefore sets out to examine how the regulatory policy governing agricultural 
biotechnology has been co-constructed by the interaction of scientists, bureaucrats, politicians, farmers, 
NGO activists, media commentators and others, across a range of sites from the more local to the 
national level and even to the global arena. A particular focus of this paper is the interaction between 
national and state level processes in the federal system, and an examination of how regulatory debates – 
formally located at the national level within national ministries and departments, firmly within the Delhi 
policy circuit – influence and, in turn, are influenced by what happens at a state level. In order to explore 
state-level dynamics in some depth, one state – Karnataka – is taken. As a major cotton producing state, 
Karnataka has a significant interest in the future of cotton production technologies, and biotechnology 
applications in particular. With its concentration of science institutes and laboratories, the Government of 
Karnataka is also positioning itself as a future biotechnology centre for India as a whole. As host of the 
Monsanto Research Centre, based on the Bangalore campus of the Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc), 
Karnataka is also seen as a key site for multinational R and D investment. This in turn has provoked 
controversy and protest among NGOs and farmers groups, and many of the significant protests against 
agricultural biotechnology over the past few years have also been played out within the state. 
The paper starts with an overview of the Indian regulatory system for biotechnology, quickly tracing 
its history and origins. This provides a background for a brief history of the Bt cotton controversy, and 
how the regulatory system has dealt with it. The paper identifies the networks that operate at the central 
level, responding to the mandated rules, guidelines and committee procedures laid down by the legislation. 
While there are tensions and fractures, there exists a reasonably stable coalition of actors linking a group 
of leading scientists (largely molecular biologists) with the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) in Delhi, 
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 and influential commercial companies with biotechnology products, most notably Monsanto/Mayhco in 
the context of Bt cotton. This grouping presents a particular view of the regulations, which upholds a 
rather narrow view of risk assessment, and a technical vision of how regulations should be implemented in 
practice. Whether anyone actually believes this is another story, but the guiding narrative is that central 
government should have the authority to regulate the growing of GM crops and that approvals must be 
based on impartial, objective, sound scientific information and advice from experts. 
Of course in practice nothing is so neat and tidy. The regulations have been intensively contested by 
individuals and groups outside this core network, and indeed from some who have been only loosely 
coopted. This dissent – from both within and outside the core network – has taken a variety of forms, and 
has been played out in a range of different sites: behind closed doors in committee rooms and through 
informal lobbying; in the market through the illegal distribution of Bt seeds; in a variety of courts through 
legal public interest petitioning; in the media, both print and internet-based; and on the streets and in 
farmers’ fields during demonstrations and direct actions of various sorts. Such contests to the regulations 
have raised a number of different perspectives, both challenging, and importantly, broadening, the 
framing of the debate from one of a narrow, “back end” concern with risks and technology impacts to a 
much wider “front end” discussion about farming, livelihood and societal futures. In Section 4, and later 
in Section 6, the paper explores this dynamic, and examines how such processes are played out, both at 
national level, but also more locally, and how in turn these Indian debates both are informed by and 
inform more global dimensions. 
The paper then turns to an examination of how the regulatory process has played out in the southern 
Indian state of Karnataka. At this level, a new set of actors and networks come into view, and with them a 
new set of political configurations, offering sometimes very different critiques of the regulations to those 
dominating at the centre. Such groupings, in turn, may have an influence on what occurs at the centre, 
mediated through combinations of scientific networks, political connections, industry lobbying or activist 
protest. Regulations, it is seen, are co-constructed through ongoing interactions between the centre and 
state in a process of iterative negotiation, where diversity rather than uniformity and dissent rather than 
consensus is the norm. While a thin veil assuming that the debate is about technical, scientific criteria, 
rather than essentially political-economic issues, is maintained, this becomes increasingly less credible 
when regulation in practice is examined. In the end, regulation is a political negotiation which takes on a 
particular form in the context of the post-reform state operating in a federal setting.  
In line with much else in Indian politics and policy, negotiation, bargaining and complex 
accommodation dominates (cf. discussions from a range of perspectives in Corbridge and Harriss 2000; 
Jenkins 1999; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Bardhan 1984). Biosafety regulatory policy is no exception, 
although in contrast to other areas more commonly analysed in the more standard political science 
literature, the mix of actors and interests, the role of technical experts, the high profile presence of 
influential multinational and Indian business interests and the level of often global activist concern makes 
the dynamic of biosafety policy particularly interesting, and perhaps reflective of an emerging politics of 
policy associated with the “new economy” in a post-reform era. The conclusion, then, moves to asking if 
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 such a politics of negotiation understanding of regulatory policy in practice is accepted, and the myth of 
linear, rational, technical, apolitical process rejected, then how might “regulation” realistically be improved 
or redefined, given the Indian context, to enhance efficacy, accountability, trust, legitimacy and inclusivity?  
 
2  The regulations 
In 1989 India established a regulatory system for the import, testing and commercialisation of genetically 
engineered material, modelled on similar frameworks from elsewhere in the world. An apparently 
straightforward approach to applications, and assessment is laid out, with a hierarchy of expert 
committees overseeing the process. Decisions are expected to be guided by assessments based on 
objective science and expert guidance, using the best experimental and monitoring information available. 
This regulatory process – argued by a former senior advisor in the Union government’s Department of 
Biotechnology – to be the most comprehensive and rigorous in the world (Ghosh 1997; Ghosh and 
Ramanaiah 2000), is supposed to deliver the benefits of agricultural biotechnology to the Indian farming 
population in an orderly and safe way. Yet it was only in 2002 – nearly nine years after the first application 
was submitted – that the first approval for commercial release was granted by the Genetic Engineering 
Approvals Committee (GEAC) under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (see below). Over this 
period, the application for approval of Bt cotton release therefore has acted as the test case for the 
regulations, sparking controversy, protest, scientific debate and some deep questioning of the regulatory 
process in its wake. 
The Department of Biotechnology was established in 1985, emerging as a separate department from 
an earlier incarnation as a small unit with the Ministry of Science and Technology. Since discussions 
around the Environmental Protection Act of 1986 there was a recognition of the need for new regulations 
to govern the import and use of genetically engineered products. The Ministry of Environment and 
Forests were already dealing with the import and export of microorganisms under the Hazardous 
Substances and Management Division, so a ready template existed, it was thought, for the generation of 
new regulations. A small drafting committee was established which included a senior adviser from the 
DBT, one university based molecular biologist and an agricultural biotechnologist from the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute (IARI). As one of the members of this group commented ‘The earlier 
regulations leaned towards pharmaceuticals. We had to revise them to incorporate agriculture. It was the 
drafting group that wrote the regulations. The other officials just signed’.2 A number of models from 
elsewhere in the world were looked at. The OECD guidelines were particularly influential, and provided, 
as with many countries in the world, a standard format for the structure of committees and procedures for 
approval. The published regulations3 identify different levels of risk, and authorise the establishment of 
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBSC) linked to each lab undertaking transgenic work, the Review 
                                                 
2  Interview, DBT official, 28 March 2001. 
3  Recombinant DNA Guidelines (DBT 1990) and Revised Guidelines for Research in Transgenic Plants and 
Guidelines for Toxicity, Allergenicity Evaluation of Transgenic Seeds, Plants and Plant Parts (DBT, August 
1998). 
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 Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) hosted by the DBT formally dealing with trials, and the 
cross-ministerial committee GEAC hosted by MoEF dealing with commercial release. DBT also host a 
Monitoring cum Evaluation Committee (MEC) which oversees the trial process (Ghosh 1997; Ghosh and 
Ramanaiah 2000; Gupta 2002). The process is supposed to be decentralised, with district biosafety 
committees overseen by district collectors throughout the country, although these seem to not actually 
exist in practice. 
The development of the legislation took time and many discussions. Someone from the MoEF who 
was involved observed:  
 
Always when you bring in new regulations there are disagreements and compromises. Amendments 
are always necessary. You cannot conceive of everything today. It helps if there is an international 
consensus. But this was absent with biotechnology. The process of consultation is very painful. 
There are too many people with ideas. Ours is a huge democracy. The problem today is that 
legislation is much bulkier. People want everything written down.  Before people were happy with 
more flexible guidelines. But with public interest litigation round the corner, we have to be secure.4  
 
However, despite the commitment that this was only a first stab at a regulatory framework, as with many 
initiatives of this sort, the incentives to change things once created are limited, and those changes that 
have occurred in 1994, and again in 1998, have been largely at the margins.5 External influences and 
models were therefore key from the start, appropriated largely to save time and effort in a pressured 
timetable set for civil servants. Since that time, external influences have continued to play a role in the 
development and interpretation of the regulations, with visits by key regulators and scientists organised to 
both Europe and the US. The existing regulations are essentially process based, with the particularities of 
genetically engineered products recognised, requiring a case by case assessment of each product. The 
tussle between the US and Europe on regulatory approaches (cf. Newell 2002), and the more general push 
towards regulatory harmonisation, has certainly been a feature of the Indian debate, with industry lobbyist 
arguing for a more streamlined, less bureaucratic approach (CII 2002).  
The criteria for assessment are indeed extensive, requiring significant amounts of data collection and 
documentation by the applicants at each stage. For lab and greenhouse work, the regulations specify the 
containment requirements for experiments. Compliance with these is monitored by the DBT-approved 
IBSC. Today, there are several hundred approved IBSCs in India, indicating the now significant scale of 
genetic engineering work ongoing.  However,  most work to  date remains at the lab  and greenhouse level 
                                                 
4  Interview, MoEF official, 29 March 2001. 
5  The 1998 revisions extended the requirements for assessment to allergenicity/toxicity testing, assessments of 
long-term environmental safety and economic benefits compared to non-Bt crops (Dhar 2002). 
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 and there are far fewer small-scale field trials, although the numbers of these continue to grow, involving 
both private and public sector research teams.6 Trials, once approved by the RCGM, are supposed to test 
the product in “contained” and “controlled” field conditions over a number of years. The regulations 
specify a range of studies that must be undertaken at the field level, including basic agronomic monitoring, 
pest incidence, pollen flow and so on. In addition, toxicity and allergenicity tests must be conducted at the 
government-approved laboratory in Lucknow. Approval for large-scale trials, seed bulking and 
commercialisation must be sought by the GEAC, once the RCGM have reviewed the field trial data. In 
the words of P.K. Ghosh, formerly advisor at the DBT: ‘the RCGM brings the science to the GEAC’.7 
Data is compiled and submitted by the applicant, although there is a key role reserved for the Monitoring 
cum Evaluation Committee who may visit test sites. In addition to fulfilling the range of scientific tests – 
in relation to gene flow risk, food safety and so on – the applicant must also make the case for the new 
technology in economic and agronomic terms by showing superior performance against different test 
crops.  
Clearly within this process there is much scope for negotiation and bargaining. While the formal 
procedures, the field trials and the laboratory tests, and the vast compilations of data dominate the visible 
process of regulation, there are inevitably other processes going on which are perhaps less tangible. Who 
are the members of these committees? What forms of expertise are brought to the table? What alliances or 
conflicts exist between key players? How do bureaucratic or political interests influence the process? In 
this hybrid world where science, business and the policy bureaucracy interact uncovering what actually 
goes on is well nigh impossible. However, the next section attempts a preliminary and necessarily 
incomplete dissection of the Bt cotton controversy over the last few years, with a view to understanding a 
bit more the politics of negotiation surrounding Bt cotton regulation. 
 
3  Bt cotton: a sketch of the regulatory controversy 
Bt cotton is an insect resistant transgenic crop with a gene (Cry1a, in the case of the Monsanto/Mayhco 
application) from the bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis, conferring some degree of resistance to lepidopteran 
pests of cotton, notably the potentially devastating bollworm. To the proponents of Bt cotton, the 
technology offers a potential solution to some of the key problems of the cotton sector. Genetically 
modified cotton is of growing importance with some 5.3mha or 16 per cent of the 34m ha of cotton 
worldwide being either round-up ready or Bt or some combination. Globally India is the third largest 
producer of cotton, producing around 2.86m tonnes on 9m ha,  representing around  15 per cent of global 
                                                 
6  Transgenic crops are being worked on by at least 25 public and private research groups across India, with over 
150 approved Institutional Biosafety committees in operation. Currently work on transgenic tobacco, potato, 
mustard, cotton, brinjal, tomato, cauliflower, rapeseed is at contained field trial stage, and further work on rice, 
tomato, cauliflower and cabbage at greenhouse stage. Field trials are being conducted by the Central Tobacco 
Research Institute, Rajahmundari; the Central Potato Research Institute, Shimla; Pro-Agro (India) Ltd, New 
Delhi; Mayhco-Monsanto Biotechnology, Mumbai; the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi; and 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (Dhar 2002: Annex Table 15).  
7  Interview, DBT, 28 March 2001. 
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 production. The export revenues generated annually amount to around Rs 25000 crores (Ghosh 2000; 
Choudhary and Laroia 2001). Yet areas planted to cotton are on the decline, as the returns to farmers 
shrink with rising costs of inputs and declining world market prices. In Karnataka, historically one of the 
main cotton producing states, the cotton area has halved since the 1970s to around 6 lakh ha.8 Both the 
financial and environmental costs of heavy pesticide applications to cotton were also being widely 
recognised, both by farmers and other commentators. Of the US$620m of pesticides applied in India a 
year, about half was applied to cotton, with an average of 7.3 sprays per year applied.9 The cotton pest 
complex includes over 160 species of insects, with 15 recognised key pests. Much damage derives from 
lepidoptera pests, notably bollworms, including the American bollworm, Helicoverpa armigera, and it is these 
that are the targets of Bt toxins which act by blocking mid-gut receptors in such insects resulting in loss of 
appetite and subsequent death. If genetically engineered cotton can reduce such pesticide inputs applied to 
combat lepidopteran pests, even with a premium being paid for the seed, it is argued, this will have 
multiple benefits – for the farmers, the agricultural economy and the environment.  
Bt cotton was first approved for commercial release in the US in 1996, where Monsanto supplies 
85 per cent of the cottonseed. In 1996–97 Bt cotton was also released in China, both by Monsanto and the 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. As early as 1990 Monsanto, the US company who patented the 
Bollgard technology, approached the Indian government through the DBT. This was rejected in 1993 on 
the basis that the technology transfer fees were too high. In 1995, Mayhco, the long established seed 
company headed by Dr Barwale, was granted permission to import 100g of transgenic cotton seed as part 
of an agreement with Monsanto. Between 1996 and 1998, Mayhco developed three backcrossed lines 
using the imported material with Mayhco cotton varieties (Mech-12, 162 and 184),10 and started 
experiments into outcrossing, germination, weediness, food and feed safety , allergenicity, toxicity and 
pollen escape. In 1998, Monsanto bought at 26 per cent stake in Mayhco creating Mayhco-Monsanto 
Biotech (India) Ltd (MMB) with a special interest in developing biotechnology products. Later that year, 
the RCGM approved 40 field trials in nine states.11 Following the review of the 1998 data the committee 
requested a further additional ten trials in 1999. The results of all the trials were presented by Mayhco to 
DBT in April 2000, resulting in RCGM clearance in May and a go-ahead from the GEAC  in July for 85ha 
                                                 
8  Department of Agriculture, Government of Karnataka website. 
9  MMB (2001). Seeds of Hope. Harnessing Biotechnology for Insect Protection and High Yield in Cotton. 
MMB: Mumbai. Sprayings are estimated to be up to 15 in AP and 9 per season in Karnataka. 
10  These varieties were destined for the central-southern cotton region, but not the north, where Mech-915 was 
deemed more suitable. This was to be tested in 2002, although this was delayed as ICAR had not been fully 
informed by GEAC. See Business Line, 2 April 2002 for a report.  
11  Field trials were approved formally by DBT on 27 July (25 trials) and 5 August (a further 15), 1998, although in 
practice they were ongoing at least from mid June and early July according to Shiva et al. (1999). In 2001 there 
were 400 trial locations in six states, including Maharashtra (180), Karnataka (89), Gujuarat (23), Madhya 
Pradesh (23) Andhra Pradesh (49) and Tamil Nadu (11), alongside a further 11 locations overseen by ICAR 
(see Asia Intelligence Wire, 20 June 2002).  
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 of large scale field trials and 150ha of seed production.12 Following the review of the results of these trials 
on 29 June 2001, the GEAC failed to give approval for commercialisation on the basis of a number of 
conditions and requirements for on-going monitoring.13 At this stage, the GEAC requested that the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) be involved to provide independent advice on the 
product. ICAR, working with agricultural universities conducted trials in 11 locations in six states in 2001, 
comparing Mech variety Bt and non-Bt together with a high performing check hybrid (NHH-44 in many 
trials). They concluded that Bt cotton was both economic and effective.14 As is shown later, the 
involvement of the ICAR and the agricultural universities was a key move, and ended several years of 
internal wrangling within the regulatory committees.  
While being presented as a straightforward technocratic process of decision-making, the committee 
processes were, not surprisingly, given the stakes, more complex than this. Ever since the refusal to allow 
Monsanto to import GM material in 1993 and the failure of the joint effort with government, there has 
been a general suspicion of Monsanto and its role. In part this comes on the back of the company’s 
disastrous PR tactics both in India and Europe during the 1990s, and the highly effective activist stance 
developed around fears of “terminator” technologies and environmental and health risks (see below). But 
the antagonism towards Monsanto – and even the alliance with Mayhco – came from other quarters too. 
Some commentators with a more conspiratorial bent argued that the regulatory delays were being 
orchestrated by the chemical pesticide companies who had a vested interest in maintaining high and 
growing pesticide sales to cotton growers.15 Others saw delays emerging more as a result of nationalist 
competition with a foreign multinational. The national research system prides itself as the organisation 
that delivered to India the Green Revolution. Although this was done with the help of the philanthropic 
foundations, the nascent CGIAR system and foreign experts such as Norman Borlaug, it was largely a 
home-grown effort, with Minister Subramaniam working alongside scientists such as Pal and 
Swaminathan, being the Green Revolution heroes (Seshia and Scoones 2003). Why shouldn’t the national 
public research system deliver the biotech revolution too some people ask? After all Bt cotton was under 
development in the ICAR system at the Cotton Research Institute at Nagpur, at IARI in Delhi, at Tamil 
Nadu  Agricultural  University in Coimbatore  and at Dharwad  in Karnataka.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
                                                 
12  ‘Monsanto’s Bt cotton gets biosafety clearance’ (Financial Express, 14 May 2000); ‘Govt gives biosafety clearance 
to Monsanto cotton’ (Express Textile, 18 May 2000); ‘Monsanto allowed field trials for cotton’ (Times of India, 
13 May 2000). Press release, MoEF, MSD Division 20 July, 2000. See ‘Extensive field trials of Bt cotton 
cleared’ (Business Line, 21 July 2000). Earlier reports indicated production increases ranging from 14 to 88 per 
cent from the trial data, see Business Line (19 January, 27 June 2000). 
13  See Frontline, 18, (July 7–20, 2001). Also see commentary by Chengal Reddy proclaiming June 19th ‘Farmers’ 
Betrayal day’. 
14  Director General Panjab Singh confirmed that Bt cotton turned out superior to non-Bt across a range of criteria 
in the ICAR trials, with an economic advantage of Rs8-10000 per acre (Business Standard, 25 June 2002). In 
April, Mangala Rai, then Deputy DG of ICAR (Crop Sciences) was quoted as saying ‘nobody can raise a 
question on the authenticity and comprehensiveness of our field investigations which indicated yield superiority 
of the Bt hybrids and their tolerance to bollworm damage in the central and southern zones’ Business Line 
(2 April 2002). 
15  Kiran Muzumdar sees the KRRS as ‘leading a pesticide lobby’ – see ‘Monsanto blamed for giving 
biotechnology a bad name’, Times of India, 15 September 2000 (see below also, footnote 92). 
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 was represented by ICAR on the GEAC, and some of the delays and requirements can possibly be seen in 
this light. As one senior university scientist involved in DBT committees put it: ‘If developed by Indian 
scientists, transgenics may have seen the light of day much earlier’.16 
Alongside these negotiations within the formal regulatory process, which has cost Monsanto/ 
Mayhco a significant sum, not counting the market foregone during the period, other things were going 
on. As the GEAC deliberated on the final decision in 2001–2002, with a further deferral in June 2001,17 
news broke that illegal Bt cotton had been planted over several years in Gujarat. In 2002 some 10000 ha 
were reported planted to Bt cotton in Gujarat alone, with other areas in Maharashtra, Madya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka also having unspecified areas under Bt cotton. The seed had been supplied 
through an Ahmedebad company, Navbharat Seeds, and had gone out to distributors in a number of 
states. A section of the vast, largely unregulated network of seed bulking, supply and distribution outfits 
had made good use of an apparently good new product and, to the delight of many farmers, had sold it at 
a reasonable, if slightly marked up, price. While the regulators were deliberating in Delhi, the farmers of 
the cotton belt were reaping the benefits of Bt cotton across large areas.  
The exposure of this put the central regulatory authorities in a difficult position. The Ministry 
ordered the destruction of the illegal crop, but the farmers and the state government argued for 
compensation. This of course was not forthcoming and following a few visits by some inspectors from 
Delhi, some burning of cotton in full view of the press, and the arrest of Patel the Managing Director of 
Navbharat Seeds, the issue was pushed aside. There was of course nothing the central state could do. And 
many in the pro-Bt cotton lobby were quietly delighted that the farmers of Gujarat had proved the market 
demand for the product and pre-empted the 2002 decision by the GEAC.18 
On 26 March 2002, the GEAC formally approved the commercial release of MMB Bt cotton for a 
three-year trial period in six states, alongside a number of conditions.19 The conditions included the 
growing of a refuge area of five rows surrounding each Bt cotton plot, early removal of the cotton crop 
following harvest, and continuous scouting through the season. Since the approval was on a trial basis, on-
going monitoring of production and pest control results was required by the GEAC, prompting a huge 
explosion  of studies,  each vying for   press attention and  demonstrating different  “results”  (see below). 
                                                 
16  Interview, Delhi University South Campus, 3 April 2001. 
17  ‘GEAC defers proposal to market Bt cotton; resolves to undertake fresh large-scale trials’ (Financial Express, 
23 June 2001); ‘Panel on genetic engineering extends field trials of Bt cotton’ (Business Standard, 22 June 2001); 
‘GEAC withholds clearance for Bt cotton cultivation’ (Economic Times, 21 June 2001). 
18  See numerous press reports, including: ‘Fate of illegal Bt cotton uncertain’ (Financial Express, 29 October 2001); 
‘Agri ministry, biotech dept disagree on Bt cotton issue’ (Economic Times, 29 October 2001); ‘Controversy over 
Bt cotton deepens’ (Business Standard, 22 October 2001); ‘Nhavbharat seeds may have to cough up Rs11crore’ 
(Economic Times, 24 October 2001); ‘Gujarat govt in dark on Bt cotton issue’ (Economic Times, 13 October 2001); 
‘GEAC orders destruction of Bt cotton crops in Gujarat’ (Economic Times, 19 October 2001). 
19  See review in Frontline, 13–26 April 2002: ‘Green signal for Bt cotton’ by R. Ramachandran. See also Times of 
India, 26 March 2003. However, the conditions were being questioned by Monsanto and others. 
T.M. Manjunath, research head of Monsanto-India commented ‘land holdings in some cotton growing pockets 
is so small that the mandatory refuge would make Bt cotton cultivation uneconomical’ (Financial Express, 
23 June 2002). Farmers were similarly sceptical in an Indian Express report one AP farmer was quoted as 
saying ‘next year I may not plant it [the refuge area] as it is a complete waste’, 12 November 2002. 
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 During the season Bt cotton was marketed at Rs1600 per packet, which comprised a 450g packet of Bt 
cotton (with Mech backgrounds), and a 120g packet for a non-Bt refuge crop. Packets intended to cover 
1.05 lakh acres were produced, intended, including 21000 packets allocated to Karnataka, which ended up 
in the planting of 16950 acres of Bt cotton in the state.20 80 per cent of these packets were sold to those in 
cluster areas surrounding trial sites, both through Mayhco and a number of other sub-licensed partners 
including Rasi, Ajeet, Krishi Dhan, Ankur and India Seeds Holdings.21 
The significance of the GEAC decision was not lost on commentators. The Bangalore-based 
industry advocate of biotech, Kiran Muzumdar-Shaw, commented: ‘With the right policy signals such as 
stem cell research and the commercialisation of Bt cotton, global venture capitalists will now be more 
inclined to invest in the Indian biotech industry’22 C.S. Prakash, the non-resident Indian scientist and 
biotech commentator (see below), stated that: ‘India should shed its conservative stand on the entry of 
transgenic crops into the country’.23 Recalling the symbolism of the Green Revolution, Dr Barwale, MD 
of Mayhco, reminisced about the parallels between the release of transgenics and the great achievements 
of the 1960s.24  
Whether the first season of Bt cotton growing has been a success or not has been the source of much 
heated debate. Literally dozens of “surveys” have been carried out, each proclaiming a result.25 There have 
                                                 
20  See ‘Monsanto cotton seeds a sell out’ (Hindu, 17 July 2002). See also Business Line, 6 July 2002. The sale price 
drew much comment, it being four times the price of comparable non-Bt hybrid cotton seed. In Gujarat the 
illegal Bt cotton had been sold at Rs500 per packet.  
21  See Business Line (16 July 2002) who asks whether the ‘highly fragmented cotton seeds market is headed for 
some sort of consolidation, with the underlying “software” (gene construct) being provided by Monsanto?’ See 
also news on Rasi seeds in Financial Express (24 May 2002). 
22  Hindu, 28 March 2002.  
23  Monsanto India, 12 April 2004. See also Economic Times interview, 26 March 2003.  
24  Hindustan Times (28 March 2002). 
25  For example in AP a Deccan Development Society-organised survey in 11 villages in Warangal was released by 
P.V. Sateesh (Business Line, 9 December 2002). Press reports in AP also reported poor performance, see for 
example: ‘Bt cotton dashes hopes of ryots’ (Hindu, 29 December 2002). In Maharashtra a team led by Dr R.B. 
Thakare editor of Farmers’ Forum reported low yields (AgBioIndia, 10 December 2002). Similarly in MP, 
extensive spraying against sucking pests was reportedly required (AgBioIndia, 10 December 2002). Yet in often 
the same places, more positive results were reported following the first pickings, with farmers reporting for 
example a 20–30 per cent yield increase in parts of AP (Indian Express, 12, 14 November 2002), and good 
results in Karnataka (C.K. Rao on www.bio-scope.org, 14 November 2002). See also ‘The verdict is in – Bt 
cotton works just fine’ (Financial Express, 20 November 2002); ‘The cotton club’ (Indian Express, 14 November 
2002). The Environment Minister, Baalu to the Rajya Sabha in December that the yields were satisfactory (see 
Times of India, 14 December 2002). Earlier in the season problems with leaf curl virus in north India, wilting and 
root rot in Maharashstra were reported and widely circulated in the anti-GM internet lists (see Business Line, 
19 August 2002; Hitavada, Nagpur, 4 September 2002, IPS, 6 September 2002). By early 2003, MMB were 
claiming great successes. See, for example: ‘Sweet harvest of Bt cotton, says firm’ (Times of India, 21 January 
2003), ‘Bt cotton yields rich dividends’ (Tribune India, 13 January 2003). However, reports from state 
departments of agriculture were more circumspect (see reports of a Sun TV interview with the AP Minister of 
Agriculture in AgBioIndia, 5 March 2003, while the Karnataka minister for agriculture, V.S. Kougaligi, was 
quoted as saying that ‘growing Bt cotton has not yielded the desired results in Karnataka’, Times of India 
(14 December 2002). The Indian Seed Industry Association president, Prabhakar Rao argued that the results 
were ‘not up to the mark’, in part because the Bt gene had been inserted into an inappropriate variety (see UNI, 
18 December 2002; Hindu, 18 December 2002). Greenpeace in turn claimed that ‘Bt cotton a 95 per cent 
failure’ (AgBioIndia, 5 March 2003), and on 10 March 2003 Gene Campaign sent a letter to the Union 
Agriculture Minister demanding compensation under the newly passed Plant Variety Protection and Farmers 
Rights Act of 2001 (see AgBioIndia, 11 March 2003). The Standing Parliamentary Committee attached to the 
Union Ministry of Agriculture reportedly found ‘little merit’ in the Bt cotton seed, finding that farmers who 
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 been many claims and counter-claims, and a certain amount of back-tracking by the pro-Bt cotton 
advocates as the results of the first year’s crop proved less positive than hoped for. The drought that 
struck large parts of the cotton zone was partly to blame, resulting in a very limited pest problem. Instead 
other diseases and pests struck, against which Bt had no effect. Those opposing Bt cotton were quick to 
jump on this, often making highly tendentious claims about how Bt cotton was an unmitigated disaster. 
But it was not only the opponents of transgenic crops who were perhaps stretching the truth a bit far. A 
huge row broke out following the publication of an article in Science, also reported in Nature, in February 
2003 (Qaim and Zilberman 2003). This used a series of somewhat dubious extrapolations to claim that Bt 
cotton could offer an 80 per cent economic advantage over non-Bt. When Monsanto in their more 
generous PR gambits were only suggesting the gain might be 20–30 per cent,26 this seemed to stretch 
credibility too far. An Indian Syngenta employee currently based in Switzerland, Shantu Shantaram, argued 
that poorly peer reviewed articles of this sort in publications like Science only undermine the case for crop 
biotechnology: ‘It is unfortunate’, he said, ‘that both Science and Nature are making very serious errors in 
judgement in this most controversial of all technologies by hastily publishing such premature manuscripts 
based on seemingly not so rigorous data. By doing so, these journals are doing a great disservice to science 
and technology development’.27 He goes on to argue that all the available data should be made available 
on the company website. Others argued that, given the controversy, ‘there is no such thing as an 
independent review in India. Anyone can manipulate the data’.28 Thus, as of mid-2003, the controversy is 
far from resolved.  
While the reviews were on-going, the farmers were planting Bt cotton, much of it illegal. Some 
estimates suggest that 90 per cent of the market share in Gujarat was “pirated” Bt cotton. In May 2003, 
The Indian Express was referring to the ‘transgenic chaos in Gujarat’s cotton belts’ and the ‘Robinhoods of 
Biotechnology’, supplying the farmers with the seed they wanted at a fraction of the price that of the now 
formally approved seed. The paper observed that: ‘The state is now virtually one big laboratory for a 
variety of hybrids of genetically modified cotton seeds – none of them cleared by government, but most 
of them sought eagerly by farmers keen on reducing pesticide consumption and increasing yields’.29 
                                                                                                                                                        
grew it did so at a loss in most places (Hindu, 26 April 2003). The GEAC meeting on 25 April 2003 did not 
approve further cultivation of Bt cotton in northern India, as the proposed variety Mech-915 was susceptible to 
leaf curl varieties, and demanded that the states provide full reports of the performance across the country to 
date (see Financial Express, 25 April 2003). Meanwhile in Gujarat the state government claimed that the illegal 
Navbharat variety was superior to the Mayhco-Monsanto one (see Indian Express, 26 April 2003). 
26  See Manjunath quoted by Financial Express, 23 June 2002.  
27  See postings on AgBioview, 21 February 2003 (special: Bt cotton in India: how successful is it?), and 
AgBioIndia, 26 February 2003. See extended discussion of the article by Devinder Sharma, AgBioIndia (14 
February 2003); ‘A scientific fairytale: providing a cover-up to the Bt cotton fiasco in India’, and Sharma’s reply 
to the Science authors’ comments on 24 February 2003. See also press commentary, ‘Yields of discontent’, 
Business World (26 March 2003). 
28  Interview, Chair Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education, India, February 2003. 
29  ‘Bales of red tape’, Indian Express (29 May 2003). 
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 4  Actors and networks 
So who are the key players in the formal regulatory process, and how are they linked? As already 
mentioned, much of the regulatory oversight falls to the Department of Biotechnology in the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. The most senior civil servant, the DBT Secretary has, since the establishment of 
the Department, been a technical appointment, drawn from the professional ranks of the wider ministry, 
rather than from the Indian Administrative Service. As a result the highest civil service appointment has 
the benefits of a technical understanding of the issues, but, because of personal and professional links in 
the area, there are dangers that this may result in the undermining of impartiality. The current secretary, 
Dr Manju Sharma, has been in post since 1996, and has overseen much of the regulatory approval process 
for Bt cotton. However, on a day to day basis the secretary relies on a number of advisors who are 
allocated to different tasks within the Department. In respect of regulation, the key advisor has been Dr 
P.K. Ghosh for much of this period who, among other things, acted, until he left DBT in 2002, as the 
Member Secretary to the RCGM committee. He has been a key figure in arguing the case for the current 
regulatory framework – in numerous articles, workshops, newspaper articles, media interviews and in 
submissions to the Supreme Court. As principal architect of the current revised regulations drawn up in 
1998, he is a firm believer in the principles laid out and the validity of the process. As a former Monsanto 
scientist conceded: ‘Ghosh oversees the process. He knows the system well. He has been part of it for a 
long time. He must cover his back. One negative press report and it takes three months to calm down. It 
is always slow.’ 
In order to gain credibility and legitimacy, the DBT must rely on its network of science advisors who 
are coopted into an enormous array of committees, advisory groups and working parties.30 As a major 
funder of biotechnology research across the country, scientists are reliant on the DBT, especially with the 
squeeze in core funding for research labs, even in the prestige relatively well funded institutions. Being in 
favour with the DBT, despite many complaints about its operations, is seen as important, and so serving 
on a committee of the DBT is, according to many informants, necessary and desirable in order to be “in 
the loop”. While some argue that, with DBT being a benefactor of so many in the biotechnology science 
community, the possibility of independence is limited, others disagree. One senior plant scientist argued: 
‘There is no conflict of interest. I am an authority on the subject: that’s what matters’.31 
In terms of biotechnology regulation, the RCGM is the key DBT committee, although the Scientific 
Advisory Committee may offer guidance in some matters. The RCGM has been headed by Professor 
Assis Datta, a reknowned molecular biologist with a successful lab at JN University, where he is also Vice-
Chancellor. The RCGM is composed of scientists, mostly molecular biologists or biochemists, operating 
in their individual capacity as “experts” in the field. As a senior committee member commented: ‘We are 
                                                 
30  See DBT website: www.dbtindia.nic.in. In addition to the RCGM, there are two scientific advisory committees, 
a research promotion committee and a total of 17 task forces on different themes (DBT Annual report, 2000–
2001). 
31  Interview, Bangalore 10 April 2001. 
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 all scientists on the committee. We can mould DBT policy’.32 Another agreed: ‘The regulatory system is 
dominated by informed scientists. This is a good thing. But it puts a lot of pressure on us to get things 
right’.33 Another observed: ‘I go to the advisory group meetings at DBT. Everyone has the same view as 
me. Agreeing is easy’.34 
Much of the committee time in the last few years has been allocated to the Bt cotton case, although 
of late there have been a number of other field trials in place.35 But despite the relatively small number of 
cases presented to it committee members privately agree that it is impossible for them to deal with all the 
paperwork, and all the minute details of the cases being made against all the varied criteria. Committee 
meetings are held in Delhi usually over one day with a late start and early finish to allow for travel, and all 
those who commented observed that the details were handled by the Member Secretary, with the 
members and the chair being adjudicators of broad fair play, rather than scrutinisers of regulatory detail. 
As one committee member put it: ‘Of course we can’t look at the detail. What do you expect? People go 
to Delhi for a meeting. The committee sits for half a day. They get the job done, sign the forms and go. 
We can complain but nothing changes much’.36 However, where concerns were raised there has been, 
according to informants, vigorous debate, but always apparently arriving at a consensus.  
Over the past nine years, Mayhco and Monsanto have had close interaction with the RCGM, and 
more particularly the civil servants from DBT overseeing the process. From the application to import 
genetically engineered cotton seed in 1993 and then again 1995 through to the submissions for 
commercialisation approval in 2001 and 2002, the company has had to submit thousands of pages of 
material, making presentations at each stage. The company has approached this task on a number of 
fronts. Mayhco-Monsanto Biotechnology (MMB) has been formally the applicant at each stage from 1995. 
Mayhco’s director, Dr B.R. Barwale, winner of the 1998 World Food Prize and well respected member of 
the Indian agricultural industry scene has been an important player. As a member DBT committees he has 
good links with the Department, as well as long-standing personal connections with other Ministries and 
key officials. At the height of the protests against Monsanto (see below), the presentation of Mayhco and 
Barwale in particular as the acceptable, Indian faces of Bt cotton were key. As one commentator put it 
‘Monsanto was clever linking up with Mayhco. It is a big and well established company, and Barwale is 
well respected’.37 The close relationship between the applicant and the regulator has, however, raised 
sceptical voices. As one leading NGO campaigner asked rhetorically: ‘Will Monsanto monitor 
Monsanto?’38 Others instead regard a close working relationship a good example of public-private 
partnership and a consensus-based negotiation of regulations. 
                                                 
32  Interview, Department of Biochemistry, IISc Bangalore, 18 January 2001. 
33  Interview, IISc, Bangalore 8 February 2001. 
34  Interview, NCBS Bangalore 13 February 2001. 
35  Currently eight different crop field trials are on-going (Dhar 2002: Annex Table 15). 
36  Interview, NCBS Bangalore, 13 February 2001. 
37  Interview, IISC, 26 February 2001. 
38  Interview, Gene Campaign, 2001 (PN). 
13 
 In terms of preparing materials for submission, the Mayhco-Monsanto technical teams followed the 
ever-expanding guidelines, documenting in detail results from the range of required tests. The presence of 
the Monsanto Research Centre in Bangalore, and extensive back up from Monsanto in the US, made the 
task more feasible, although nevertheless time-consuming and cumbersome. Many industry informants 
noted that Monsanto was really the regulatory guinea pig, jumping all the hurdles and, hopefully, 
smoothing the way for other applications. As the MRC head put it: ‘Monsanto as the pioneer has paid the 
price. We were the first and regulations had to evolve’.39 It is not surprising that Pro-Agro, an applicant 
for GM mustard, has kept its head down, as its potentially more controversial application (given that 
mustard oil is widely consumed as a food) has not drawn the same publicity as Bt cotton.40 
In parallel to the accumulation of evidence for presentation to the regulatory authorities, Monsanto 
engaged in a broader public relations effort. The news reporting service offered by the company through 
the email and by fax kept media people abreast of developments, and with a most definite pro-GM spin. 
Newspaper adverts, public opinion surveys, open-days, workshop talks, video presentations were all part 
of a well orchestrated approach to win over a generally hostile public mood coordinated by the Mumbai 
“government and public affairs” department of Monsanto, with heavy backing from head office in St 
Louis Missouri. In addition to these more up front approaches, behind-the-scenes lobbying has also been 
part of the approach adopted. Monsanto has informally funded a range of different activities, events and 
groups which are aimed at promoting biotechnology and Bt cotton in particular,41 as well as visits to India 
by articulate advocates of biotechnology.42 Monsanto has also been an active participant in the US 
government’s study visits to the US, aimed at showcasing US biotechnology experience, including the 
benefits of its regulatory approach. Through funding offered by the US Embassy in Delhi, a number of 
scientists, DBT officials and others have travelled on such study tours. 
It is difficult to gauge how Monsanto/Mayhco influenced the regulatory decision process and 
through what means. Of the informants who were RCGM committee members, the general view was that 
the committee “worked well” and maintained its “independent” stance. Its efficient functioning was 
essentially because it was managed by a competent, informed civil servant, and was composed of like-
minded people, who concentrated on “the science”. By providing the DBT legitimacy and authority, the 
scientific community (or more particularly the biotechnology/molecular biology community) ensured that 
                                                 
39  Interview, TM Manjunath, Monsanto Bangalore, 22 February 2001. 
40  Although see press commentary in November 2002 when a decision by GEAC was delayed, and March 2003 
when the application was rejected pending further trials. See ‘GM mustard put on hold’ (Times of India, 
8 November, 2002); ‘ICAR calls for more trials on GM mustard’ (Financial Express, 17 November 2002); 
‘Mustard mess’ (Times of India, 3 December 2002), for example. 
41  For example, the Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education, founded in 2001 by Dr Kameswara 
Rao and based in Bangalore. 
42  C.S. Prakash, professor in plant molecular genetics from Tuskegee University in Alabama, in particular has 
been especially vocal. He is a member of the US Department of Agriculture’s Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee and he also sits on the DBT Government of India’s Scientific Advisory Committee (Overseas). His 
website AgBioWorld (www.agbioworld.org) and newsletter AgBioView carry regular pro-GM crop 
commentaries. He has also organised a global petition or declaration of support of agricultural biotechnology 
signed by 3,200 scientists including Norman Borlaug, James Watson and Gurdev Khush. Both his website and 
his trips to India to promote biotechnology are reportedly sponsored by corporate interests. 
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 the regulations could be upheld as based on a rational, objective and scientific approach. While there were 
disputes about what data was needed, how rigorous the trials were and whether more extended tests were 
needed, the fact that the RCGM was dealing with “research” and not commercial release meant that 
things never got too heated. Certainly there was concern raised about the potential bias of data only 
produced by the commercial applicant, and the apparent side-lining of the agricultural universities and 
ICAR did become and issue (see below). This in particular raised some hackles, and in 2001 seemed to be 
jeopardising the credibility of the process. A University of Agricultural Sciences (Bangalore) researcher 
commented then on the trial monitoring process: 
 
How competent are these M and E committees? You visit for a day or an hour, with briefcase in 
hand. The pure scientists in these groups may know the plant system, but not the crop and certainly 
not the farmers. The company provides everything. Hospitality, transport is organised by Monsanto. 
What can be learned? People just sign and approve. What can you tell from visual inspection – the 
crop is there, the plot size is such and such. What use is this?43 
 
However, it was only when the commercialisation decision came close and the issue was referred to the 
GEAC did these issues become really hot topics. The GEAC of the MoEF operates outside the rather 
more cosy confines of the DBT-centred networks of the RCGM, and is the interministerial committee 
which must approve any environmental releases. This includes any permissions for large scale field trials, 
seed multiplication and commercial release. Unlike the RCGM, the GEAC is an inter-ministerial 
committee with representatives from a wide range of ministries and departments.44 As a senior DBT 
official complained: ‘This results in constant reshuffles. Twelve secretaries in twelve years. And they are 
not necessarily technical people. We need more scientists, otherwise we have to reeducate people 
continuously’.45 The GEAC is seen to fulfil the necessary bureaucratic function of ensuring safety and 
acceptability across a range of ministerial concerns and mandates, to ensure that all government players 
become committed to the decision. In the view of the DBT, the RCGM provides the necessary technical 
and scientific advice for the GEAC to formally make the decision, making the GEAC the formal, 
bureaucratic rubber-stamping body, with the key decisions and advice emerging from the expert-led, 
science-based RCGM.  
However, once the decision enters the melee of departmental rivalry and bureaucratic politics at the 
central governmental level, simple rational scientific criteria are less of a concern. A major division has 
                                                 
43  Interview, UAS, 12 March 2001. 
44  The current chair (from early 2003) is Shushma Choudhary who replaced A.M. Gokhale. If applicants are 
aggrieved by the GEAC decision they can appeal to the Appellate Authority under the former Union 
Environment Secretary, Vishanath Anand. Members include representatives from the Ministry of Industrial 
Development and Department of Science and Technology, Ocean Development and Biotechnology. Other 
members are drawn from the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), the Indian Council for Medical 
Research (ICMR), the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and the Central Pollution Board. 
A Health Services member from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is also included, along with a Plant 
Protection Adviser and three experts in the relevant fields (Dhar 2002). 
45  Interview, DBT, March 2001. 
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 already been hinted at between the Ministry of Science and Technology/DBT – strong proponents of 
biotechnology as a key driver of the new economy and the supporters of a large and influential group of 
molecular biologists across the country, many with strong industry connections – and the Ministry of 
Agriculture/ICAR – with their comparable commitment to biotechnology, but with different funding 
streams and more scepticism about how the new technology should fit with more conventional 
approaches to agricultural research and development, and particularly the role of the public sector effort. 
The ICAR representative on the GEAC reportedly regularly made it clear that a gung-ho private sector led 
approach was not wise, and that there should be more reliance on the public sector, both in terms of 
regulatory approval and technology development.46 Ministry of Agriculture officials have made it clear on 
a number of occasions that they believe that agricultural technology approvals should be under their 
ministry, rather than under MoEF. There were also questions raised by the Ministry of Health who at 
times had felt side-lined by the process. This was partly because of the lack of concrete data on health 
effects one way or the other, meaning that health matters were seen not to be fully considered. Shortly 
before he resigned, former Union Health Minister, C.P. Thakur commented: ‘GM products could have 
long-term environmental and health effects. It is essential that the Health Ministry is involved more in 
such decisions’.47 But despite this wrangling internally on the committee between different arms of the 
bureaucracy, the recognition that any decision was ultimately a political one was acknowledged by a senior 
DBT official: ‘For approval there will have to be wide political consultation beyond the GEAC. Even if 
the scientific community approves, there will still be a delay as consultations occur, with eminent people 
like Swaminathan and politicians’.48 
Others have asked whether the GEAC should exist as currently constituted at all. The CII, for 
example, in its high profile launch of its White Paper on biotechnology argued for a fast track single 
window approval process to speed up investment in biotechnology – and particularly the pharma/medical 
sector – and argue for the separation of functions, with regulatory approval being granted by different 
bodies depending on the type of product (CII 2002; Newell 2003). As a CII official noted: ‘We are trying 
to sell India as a biotech location. But government needs to do more. It’s the bureaucratic process that’s 
important. It is an ad hoc system, with lack of clarity and delays. We need an industry friendly single 
agency with all the experts in one place’.49 Noting the regulatory furore created by agricultural products, 
many in the biotech industry feel frustrated that this is holding back the development of the industry as a 
whole and so argue for the separation off of the agricultural sector, and with this the bad publicity, public 
anxiety and regulatory attention associated with Monsanto and others.  
                                                 
46  Following the rejection of Pro-Agro’s GM mustard application, Deputy DG of ICAR, Mangala Rai was quoted 
as saying ‘ICAR is a responsible public sector research institution having international reputation. ICAR cannot 
just abide by the dictates of GEAC for no further trials . . .’ (Financial Express, 17 November 2002). 
47  IPS press release, 6 September 2002. See AgBioIndia archive, September 2002. The recognition that conflicts 
between ministry positions was proving problematic was highlighted by the convening of a ‘high level 
interministerial meeting’ in early 2003, with the aim of ‘fixing the responsibilities of the various ministries and 
ironing out interministerial differences’ (Deccan Herald, 27 February 2003).  
48  Interview, DBT, 28 March 2001. 
49  Interview, CII, March 2001 PN. 
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 Thus in the context of the different committees and stages of the regulatory process, different actors 
and interests and so associated tactics and strategies of negotiation, become important. While the RCGM 
is less overtly political compared to the GEAC in terms of (semi)public contestations over roles and 
influence, nevertheless the move of framing the regulations in a particular narrow way, with science-based 
risk assessment at the centre, must be seen in a political light. By removing certain debates from regulatory 
purview, the way the regulations are discursively framed and in turn institutionalised in particular 
scientific-administrative procedures has unquestionably political effects. 
Defending the line between this narrow, technical, risk assessment approach and the wider debate 
within which the regulatory approval process is set has been an important task for the DBT, and 
particularly P.K. Ghosh, the former advisor. At the same time, along with the DBT Secretary and other 
department officials, he had to fulfil the DBT mandate of “promoting biotechnology” 50 through articles, 
speeches and press interviews making the case for Bt cotton, pointing to its potential economic and 
environmental benefits, and, at the same time, he was having to defend the thoroughness and probity of 
the regulatory procedure to increasingly vocal critics. That he and the DBT in general was not always 
believed is perhaps not surprising. As the person on the front-line for press comment and public defence 
of governmental action, he was unquestionably in a difficult position, and clearly resented the fact that 
many other scientists preferred to keep quiet and avoid comment. As the protests against Bt cotton rose to 
a head in 1998–99, he commented that ‘I was sitting on top of a volcano. Now we have faced the volcano 
and somehow we survived’.51 It was this more general loss of trust in the legitimacy and authority of the 
regulatory process – and DBT in particular – that became critical as we shall see in providing 
opportunities for challenging the framing and procedural institutionalisation of the regulations in this 
period. 
The management of the regulatory process has been characterised by a relatively tight grouping of 
people, with few opportunities for wider deliberation. There has been a marked absence of open 
discussion and sharing of information on the details of the regulatory deliberations. The DBT has also had 
limited interaction with opposition groups and the broader public, except through a limited number of 
public events and media briefings. In private, and sometimes in public, DBT officials deem opposition 
groups to be rabble-rousers, unscientific, emotional, political and therefore not worth engaging with. One 
DBT official described the debate as constructed around ‘superstitions, mystical threats and hypothetical 
risks’.52 The broader public is seen as unduly influenced by dramatic media stories, and essentially ignorant 
of complex scientific issues, and in need of education. A senior IISc biotech scientist put it this way: 
‘Public understanding is key. We need to educate the public. The scientific community need to come up 
                                                 
50  Promotion as well as regulation are both part of the formal mission of the DBT. This ambiguous role was 
confirmed by the current DBT Secretary who was quoted as saying ‘Bt cotton is only released commercially 
after convincing farmers about its benefits . . .’ (Deccan Herald, 19 November 2002). 
51  Interview, DBT, 28 March 2001. 
52  Interview, DBT, March 2001 PN. 
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 with a statement of the facts’.53 Others argue that, rather than the urban-based activist groupings 
becoming involved in the regulatory process, it must be the farmers themselves. In the end, they argue, it 
will be the market that decides, not the “experts”. As Ghosh himself commented ‘Science will not find us 
all the answers . . . In the end society has to find the answers. Ultimately the debate will be decided in the 
fields by the farmers themselves’.54   
The DBT, and the regulatory authorities more generally, certainly seem to play by the rules. But these 
are rules that have been developed by them, and a close-knit coterie of advisors and others. And, 
increasingly, these rules are being questioned, both on their own terms and in relation to a broader debate 
about technology and development policy. While this questioning may be dismissed as emotional, 
irrational and unscientific, it is important not to ignore the wider implications of this broader debate. Even 
if such perspectives are primarily emanating from a relatively small grouping of people, with no justifiable 
claim to be speaking for a wide constituency, the reverberations of the debate may have implications 
elsewhere, galvanising others to develop their own (often very different) positions, and encouraging a 
diversity of views and voices to enter the discussion – sometimes, as with the very vocal and visible 
protestors, in the public eye, but sometimes more subtly and behind the scenes. The next sections, then, 
turn to the way the expertise of those at the centre of regulatory authority is being challenged on a number 
of fronts, and how such dissent is manifested in the emergence of new coalitions of actors, presenting 
alternative perspectives on the regulation of Bt cotton specifically, and the future of biotechnology in 
India more generally. 
 
5  Contesting the regulations 
Outside the formal regulatory committees, the regulatory process surrounding Bt cotton has been marked 
by much controversy and debate. For some, Bt cotton has become symbolic of a much wider struggle 
against the dominance of multinational capital, particular forms of technological modernisation, and 
globalisation more generally. Thus alliances are potentially forged between those concerned with the 
protection of indigenous crop varieties in dryland farming areas, different styles of nationalists interested 
in protecting the Indian economy and culture outside depredation, and from anti-globalisation protestors, 
linked to an international network of activists. Clearly, such debates go far beyond the regulation of 
technological risk that is overseen by the DBT and the MoEF. As a MoEF official put it: ‘Thanks to the 
NGOs, half our time is spent in the courts!’.55 
Soon after Bt material was imported, objections were raised and presented as a court petition by the 
Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) headed by Vandana Shiva disputing 
the form and content of the regulations on. But things really started to heat up in 1998, sparked in 
                                                 
53  Interview, IISc, 8 February 2001. This commentary is very similar to that observed in Europe where the public 
shows a much more sophisticated understanding of risks and uncertainties than is conventionally assumed 
(Marriss et al. 2001). 
54  Interview, DBT, 28 March 2001. 
55  Interview, MoEF, 29 March 2001. 
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 particular by the controversy about the “terminator gene”.56 Monsanto, as potential purchase of Delta 
Pine, the co-owner of the terminator patent (with USDA), became implicated by association. The press 
commentary, fuelled by plenty of carefully pitched briefings from international groups such as RAFI 
(Rural Advancement Foundation International, now ETC group) and GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action 
International), elided the issues, such that Bt cotton (already synonymous with Monsanto) became linked 
to terminator technology. Despite strenuous denials by Monsanto PR officials,57 questions in parliament, 
and much media commentary, the issue had been raised, and the links made.  
By mid-1998 a public relations battle was on. Monsanto launched a series of adverts in the press. At 
the same time, NGO groups also launched the Monsanto Quit India campaign, symbolically choosing 
9 August, the day Gandhi launched the Quit India struggle against British occupation.58 Although it was 
well known that field trials had been established, details of field trials became public only in November, 
following formal approval at the end of July and early August. State governments were furious at the lack 
of coordination with them.59 In Karnataka the Agriculture minister, Byre Gowda, established an expert 
panel to discuss the issue.60 Through pressure from the media, the four locations of the field sites in the 
state were also made public. Immediately following this, the KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha, 
perhaps the most famous Karnataka farmers’ movement) announced the ‘Cremate Monsanto’ campaign in 
November 1998. KRRS leader, Professor Nanjundaswamy identified the following slogans ‘Stop Genetic 
Engineering’, ‘No Patents on Life’, ‘Cremate Monsanto’ and ‘Bury the WTO’. He gave notice that all trial 
sites in Karnataka would be burned the following Saturday under media scrutiny.61 The US embassy in 
turn requested police protection for US companies in Bangalore, and the High Court of Karnataka ruled 
to protect sites and the property of Mayhco seed firm.62 In Bellary and Raichur districts the trial farmers 
                                                 
56  See, for example, ‘Patent for terminator technology filed in India, experts worried’ (Indian Express, 
29 December 1998). Also see the articles by Gail Omveldt ‘Terminating choice’ and Vandana Shiva, 
‘Terminating freedom’ (Hindu, 26 December 1998). See also: ‘Terminator seeds not permitted in India: agric 
minister’ (Economic Times, 3 December 1998); ‘Terminator gene is not being used, says MNC’ (Indian Express, 
3 December 1998); ‘Seeds of conspiracy’ (Hindustan Times, 3 December 1998); ‘Terminator seed tech will be 
banned: Som Pal’ (Indian Express, 2 December 1998); ‘Terminator seeds not allowed’ (Hindu, 2 December 
1998); ‘Gene terminator creates panic’ (Times of India, 28 November 1998); ‘Terminator gene row a fabrication: 
Monsanto’ (Times of India, 26 November 1998); ‘India gears up to face the threat posed by the terminator gene’ 
(Indian Express, 10 September 1998); ‘Stop entry of terminator into India, urge scientists’ (Indian Express, 28 July 
1998); ‘The demon seeds’ (Hindu, 24 July 1998); ‘Infamous invention’ (Hindu, 19 July 1998); ‘Farmers count 
seedlings as Terminator gets canned’ (Economic Times, 18 July 1998). 
57  See ‘Monsanto releases educative ads’ (Financial Express, 8 December 1998). 
58  See ‘Indians fight biotechnology giants: implement “operate cremate Monsanto”’, ‘Monsanto quit India’ 
campaign, press release RSFTE, New Delhi. See also: ‘KRRS threatens nationwide agitation against Monsanto, 
24 October 1998; ‘KRRS threatens to throw out Monsanto’ (Times of India, 23 November 1999). 
59  For example, Karnataka Agriculture Minister, Byre Gowda indicated he had been informed of the presence of 
trials, but had no idea where they were (‘Seeds of controversy’, Indian Express, 18 November 1998). Only on 
24 November did he release details of where the four locations were in Raichur, Bellary and Haveri. 
60  ‘Panel to check field trials of terminator gene technology’ (Hindu, 25 November 1998). 
61  The first burning took place on 28 November 1998 with the consent of the farmer. Activists from KRRS along 
with the (little known) ‘Progressive Front’, ‘Action Front for the Untouchables’, ‘Karnataka Liberation Front’ 
and the ‘Organisation of the Landless’, according to a press release from KRRS, Bangalore. The burning was 
also attended by a five member team from the Geneva based ‘Global People’s Action Group’ according to 
Indian Express, 30 November 1998. 
62  See ‘Police protection to all American companies in Bangalore city’ (Samytkta Karnataka, 25 November 1998); 
also ‘HC orders security to seed firm’ (Times of India, 4 December 1998). 
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 agreed to the demands of the protestors and their crops were burnt. However Mr Sankarikoppa of Haveri 
district resisted and sought police protection, with the police deploying ‘a van load of constables to stand 
guard in his field’63. This stand against KRRS put Sankarikoppa at the forefront of the pro-GM movement 
in the state, and from that time on he regularly appeared at Monsanto events proclaiming on the benefits 
of Bt cotton. In a move which preempted further protests, and in a sign of annoyance that they too had 
not been adequately informed, the Andhra Pradesh government banned the trials at the end of the year, 
and requested that they be moved to an agricultural university to allow more thorough state level 
scrutiny.64 By December, the KRRS threatened to launch a criminal case under the Union Seed Act in 
magistrates courts where the trials were underway against Monsanto, as well as the state and central 
government, on the basis that trials in Karnataka were illegal.65 
The media debate continued into the following year, with plenty of opportunity for coverage 
prompted by a number of workshops and conferences.66 By this time, the debate had become more 
sophisticated, and the coverage offered greater depth and commentary, compared with the earlier 
discussions around terminator technology. Monsanto, though, were still in the spotlight, particularly 
following their attempts to import plasmids for transgenic crop research at their Bangalore research 
centre.67 With the flurry of anti-GM protest occurring in late 1998, there were also some more concerted 
counter moves by the pro-GM lobby, with interventions from non-resident Indian scientists (most 
notably C.S. Prakash from Tuskagee University, USA who made several visits to India and managed to 
place a wide range of articles in the press), other farmer leaders (including Sharad Joshi of Shektari 
Sanghatana, and Chengal Reddy of the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Association)68 and industry 
commentators (including a more measured, less brash contribution from Monsanto which had 
commissioned a public opinion survey which, rather unsurprisingly, showed how farmers were in support 
of biotechnology).69 With the exception of a few regular commentators from the scientific community 
                                                 
63  ‘Anti-Monsanto campaign runs into dry ground’ (Pioneer Press Service, 5 December 1998); ‘Haveri farmers will 
resist KRRS destruction trail’ (Times of India, 5 December 1998); ‘Haveri farmers have not asked for protection: 
police’ (Times of India, 1 December 1998). See also ‘Join us in burning cotton crop, KRRS chief urges Byre 
Gowda’ (Times of India, 6 December 1998). 
64  ‘Monsanto told to stop field trials’ (Indian Express, 3 December 1998); ‘Seeds of controversy’ (Times of India, 
4 December 1998). 
65  ‘KRRS to file criminal case against Monsanto’ (Deccan Herald, 18 December 1998); ‘KRRS threatens to destroy 
Monsanto crops’ (Deccan Herald, 2 December 1998); ‘KRRRS will destroy Bt cotton crop in Bellary today. Says 
it will file criminal cases against Monsanto, state and central govts’ (Times of India, 2 December 1998). 
66  For example, the TERI “stakeholder dialogues” (see Economic Times, 26 November 1999); the National Science 
Summit in Bangalore (Times of India, 9 August 1999); the 86th Science Congress in Chennai where James Watson 
spoke alongside Manju Sharma who gave the Presidential address (Indian Express, 1 February 1999); the MSSRF 
national consultation on GM plants also held in Chennai (Business Line, 13 January 1999); and the UAS-
Bangalore seminar on ‘Environmental and Health risks associated with transgenic plants’ at which various DBT 
officials and other scientists spoke (Times of India, 23 December 1998). 
67  See ‘Monsanto proposal to genetically alter rice draws flak’ (Economic Times, 6 August 1999); ‘Monsanto raises 
more dust in Indian fields’ (Economic Times, 6 August 1999); ‘Monsanto turns to food crops’ (Hindu, 6 August 
1999). 
68  ‘Farmer leader pleads for immediate release of GM crops in India’ (Financial Express, 24 April 2000). See 
‘Yielding positive results: gene revolution as farming aid’ by Chengal Reddy, Financial Express, December 2000. 
69  ‘Farmers support biotech use for increasing yield – Monsanto study’ (Financial Express, 31 August 1999). 
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 (including Professor G. Padmanaban, former director of the Indian Institute of Science70 and former 
CCMB director Dr Pushpa M. Bhargava)71 there remained very few local Indian scientists prepared to 
enter the fray, although the likes of Norman Borlaug were not shy of offering their opinion in pieces 
placed in the Indian press.72 
The anti-GM groupings, always on the look out for good media opportunities, also had their share of 
exposure during 1999. For example, the caravan to Europe, part of a protest about globalisation and the 
WTO more generally, occurred in May and June, with KRRS leader, Nanjundaswamy, as ever, ready for 
media comment.73 Through 1999 and 2000 there were also further court case cases lodged by public 
interest petitions by the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) with the 
Supreme Court, with much media exposure for Vandana Shiva, the internationally well-known activist.74 
The cases contested the legitimacy of the field trials on the basis of alleged technical failings of trial 
procedure according to the regulations. At the same time, issues around the patenting of local materials 
were raised effectively on various occasions highlighting the dangers of biopiracy by large, foreign (usually 
US) companies. The big industry gathering for the Asia Seed conference in September 2000 in Bangalore 
provided an excellent opportunity for a counter-protest, and the “seed tribunal” offered both testimonies 
by farmers from across the country and a “judgement” by a leading judge on biotechnologies, and an 
associated call for a moratorium on testing. As one journalist commented of this period: ‘there was no 
problem getting good copy. Monsanto would send sometimes several faxes a day, and all I needed to do 
was ring up one of the anti-GM groups and get a response’.75 Thus dissent, protest and questioning of 
biotechnology was a constant feature of the daily media (at least in the English press, but also to a lesser 
extent the vernacular press too). 
In the last three years, this pattern of activist protest has become well established. International 
events – whether the Social Forum in Porto Allegre, Brazil, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg, South Africa or major international meetings on biotechnology across 
Europe, North America and elsewhere in Asia – have been used to provide a platform (or a site of 
protest) for the raising of local issues which in turn have been picked up by the international and local 
press. At home the courts have seen much continued action, with public interest litigation following thick 
and fast. The RFSTE petition involved extensive hearings at the Supreme Court and vast amounts of 
evidence submitted. Others have followed suit, including a Delhi High Court action by Gene Campaign in 
                                                 
70  See for example ‘Bt cotton trials harmless, aver experts’ (Indian Express, 24 December 1998); ‘India definitely 
needs transgenic technology’ (Economic Times, 24 August 2001). 
71  Bhargava has maintained a sceptical tone, including critical comments at the People’s Science Congress held 
alongside the annual Science Congress in New Delhi in January 2001 (Press Trust of India, 2 January 2001). 
72  For example: ‘We need biotechnology to feed the world’ (Financial Express, 13 December 2000). 
73  ‘Indian farmers take the war to Europe’ (IPS, 25 May 1999). See also an article by Sharad Joshi: ‘Indian 
peasants on European jaunt’ (Business Line, 10 March 1999). 
74  The public interest petition sought judicial intervention to check alleged violation of the regulations, and the 
Supreme Court issued notices to federal ministries of science and technology, agriculture and environment and 
forests in February 1999. The Supreme Court rejected Monsanto’s plea for the dismissal of the litigation, and 
the case was heard on a number of occasions (see Economic Times, 19 November 2000). RFSTE have claimed 
the 2002 decision to allow commercialisation as illegal as the PIL was still pending.  
75  Interview, Financial Express journalist, Chennai, February 2001. 
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 2001 claiming that the illegal sales of GM seeds in Gujarat were done with the knowledge of the 
government.76 A further petition by the Gene Campaign arguing for the right to information disclosure on 
trial results under the Freedom of Information Act.77 Other forms of litigation have occurred in other 
courts, for example farmers’ groups from Vidharba region threatened action in the Mumbai High Court 
demanding compensation for the failure of the Bt cotton crop in Maharashtra in 2003.78 Similarly, the 
Gene Campaign has demanded compensation for farmers under the terms of the 2001 Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act.79  
Other more direct forms of protest have continued, with the KRRS being active in crop burning 
media events, and arguing for a five-year moratorium on GM seeds.80 Protests have occurred in a variety 
of places, including, following the commercial release of Bt cotton in 2002, at the research headquarters of 
Monsanto in India at the IISc, Bangalore.81 Events such as the citizen juries in Karnataka in 2000 and in 
Andhra Pradesh in 2001 have also provided foci for activists to denounce GM crops and the associated 
future vision for agriculture assumed to go with them.82 Media interest has remained high and the 
continuous briefing and counter-briefings have occurred, with competing internet-based services 
providing alternative views on the Indian scene.83 
A new politics of dissent around Bt cotton had been manufactured, where the debate was taken 
beyond the technical specifics of Bacillius thuringiensis and effectiveness or otherwise of mid-gut receptor 
interactions, to a wider set of anxieties about corporate control, farmers’ rights and livelihoods. The 
NGOs and farmer movements in India drew very explicitly on their international connections. RAFI, 
GRAIN and other international networks and activist organisations provided a continual stream of press 
briefings to counter the Monsanto PR campaign. Attempts by influential scientists to intervene, and 
impose what they saw as the need for rational debate were by-passed. The frustration from the core 
grouping associated with the formal regulatory procedures was tangible. P.K. Ghosh resignedly 
commented ‘it is like a first pregnancy, there are always more problems’,84 while leading Indian scientists, 
echoing the comments made by the Nobel laureate James Watson in Chennai in early 1999 
                                                 
76  Business Line, 23 November 2001. 
77  Gene Campaign president Suman Suhai wrote to the National Academy of Agricultural Sciences head, V.L. 
Chopra, requesting that they oversee the release of the trial data for public scrutiny. She claimed that the 
current situation contravened the Freedom of Information Act (see Deccan Herald, 8 August 2002). However, 
reports in early 2003 suggest that this pressure has had some effect. A high level inter-ministerial meeting was 
held in February 2003 and a commitment made to make the field trial results available to the public. This 
however would be limited by commercial confidentiality considerations, such that key data such as the level of 
Bt expression in cotton plants would not be made available (Deccan Herald, 27 February 2003). 
78  Details of the Maharashtra farmers movement action is covered in www.agbioindia/archive, see posting 
11 March 2003. 
79  See text of letter to Union Minister of Agriculture at www.agbioindia.org/archive/, posted 11 March 2003. 
80  ‘KRRS opposes commercial release of Bt cotton seeds’ (Economic Times, 20 June 2001). 
81  See ‘Demand for Monsanto’s ouster picks up. Karnataka bans Monsanto’s Bt cotton seeds’, AgBioIndia, 
11 August 2002, and Deccan Herald, 9 August 2002. 
82  See ActionAid (2000); Pimbert and Wakeford (2002). 
83  For example, AgBioIndia (www.Agbioindia.org), supported by Delhi based activist Devinder Sharma, and 
more international lists (including bio_activists@iatp.org) with a more sceptical crops stance, and AgBioWorld, 
supported by C.S. Prakash) and Monsanto India (www.monsantoindia.com) taking more pro-biotech positions. 
84  Interview, DBT, 28 March 2001. 
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 (MSSRF 1999), saw the dangers of excessive caution being introduced on the basis of irrational, non-
scientific debate. Leave it to us, we are the experts, was their view. But, in the meantime, and partly in 
reaction to this arrogant style, the argument was pushed to a different level.  
 
6  Citizens and activists 
This was therefore becoming a struggle against not just the Bt technology, but the whole vision of 
agriculture and technological control that, according to the critics, the adoption of biotechnology would 
imply. There was therefore a questioning of the narrow, technical, rational discourse on which the 
regulatory process was based, through the demand for a wider debate. Symbolic links to deeper, cultural 
and political associations were also explicitly made in order to embed the dissent in a wider and longer 
running politics. Thus Vandana Shiva, director of RFSTE refers to the “second cotton colonisation”85 and 
makes links to struggles over rights to land, seeds and the body; protest marches commemorate Ghandi’s 
struggles against the British, and Professor Nanjundaswamy, the leader of the KRRS, makes rhetorical 
links to struggles against globalisation and the need for a “khadi curtain” to protect Indian peasants 
against foreign capital.86 While such rhetorical flourishes can easily be dismissed (and indeed are by many), 
what is important is that they are part of the debate, reported, discussed and responded to. As one 
agricultural university scientist commented: ‘Whatever you think about them [the anti-GM protestors], the 
important thing is that Bt cotton is being debated. Otherwise it would not be talked about. This is the 
good thing about democracy’.87 
So who are the protestors? The Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, led by 
Vandana Shiva has perhaps been involved in the biotechnology debate for the longest, and has pursued an 
approach which has combined activist writing (including regular newspaper/magazine articles, and books 
(e.g. Shiva 2001, 1993), legal challenges to the Supreme Court of India (dates,) involving the production of 
voluminous quantities of case material, and the hosting of events (e.g. seed tribunal etc.). Vandana Shiva 
has a long history as an environmental activist, and is particularly well known internationally. She presents 
herself as a scientist, but also at the same time as someone who is linked to the grassroots and particularly 
rural women. An earlier ally was the KRRS, and particularly its President Professor M.D. Nanjundaswamy, 
one time lawyer and aspiring party politician in Karnataka, but also the leader of the KRRS, based in 
Bangalore.  He again  claims  expertise  (‘these  people  used  to  be  my  students’  referring  to  Karnataka 
                                                 
85  ‘Monsanto’s bollgard: poison or panacea?’, Times of India (3 January 1999). 
86  Rhetorical links to Ghandian struggles, such as “khadi curtain” (referring to the struggle against British cotton 
imports and the Ghandian vision of making locally manufactured alternatives (khadi cotton), are all part of the 
debate. 
87  Interview, University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore, February 2003. 
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 ministers), and local connections through a mass membership movement.88 A Monsanto official 
commented with some resignation: ‘For Nanjundaswamy, it’s a way of life – biotech, fashion shows, 
whatever. He gets quoted and gets a profile’.89 Other key players include Suman Suhai, founder of the 
Gene Campaign, and Devinder Sharma, of the Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security and editor of 
the influential AgBioIndia website.90 Both these organisations and individuals are seen as more 
“moderate”, but essentially develop a similar argument about agricultural biotechnology. Although their 
tactics involve less direct protest and more engagement, the basic message is the same: Bt cotton should 
be stopped. 
All have impressive international links, through the global network of NGOs and other groups 
working on biotechnology and farmers’ rights. Canada-based RAFI and Spain-based GRAIN have been 
important in supporting campaign against “terminator” technology for example, while organisations such 
as Via Campesina have joined up with KRRS (with their South Asia coordinator being KRRS president, 
Prof. Nanjundaswamy). The anti-globalisation group, Global People’s Action, have been present at a 
variety of actions, including GM-crop burnings in Karnataka. In early 1999, KRRS and Via Campesina 
organised a four-day international conference in Bangalore focusing on agrarian reform issues.91 In 
September 2000, to coincide with the major Asia Pacific Seed Association conference, the RFSTE 
organised a “seed tribunal” in Bangalore attended by farmers from the US, Canada and France, while 
Greenpeace staged demonstrations outside the conference venue.92 A few days later the annual Via 
Campesina meeting provided a focus for more protests, and further threats from Nanjundaswamy to 
destroy field trials in Karnataka.93 
The degree to which such “movements” “fora” and “campaigns” represent a wider constituency is 
open to debate. Much commentary on “farmers movements” in India has noted how they are represented 
by very sectional interests, largely of middle income farmers, keen to preserve the privileges of subsidy and 
state support, in the face of an increasingly organised urban middle class and increasingly bankrupt state 
governments (Brass 1995; Corbridge and Harriss 2000). The KRRS in particular has come in for much 
                                                 
88  Interview, Bangalore, February 2001. The KRRS and Nanjundaswamy in particular have been involved in 
activist politics in Karnataka, south India for many years. Of late the Bt cotton issue has attracted attention, but 
in the past protests have been directed against Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets in Bangalore, as well as a Miss 
World competition. The anti-GM focus emerged through connections with a wider network of global activists, 
including Via Campesina and various anti-globalisation groups. KRRS once attempted to gain a foothold in 
electoral politics but failed dramatically and since then their attentions have been focused on both lobbying for 
particular farmers’ needs and engagement in wider, more global issues such as WTO membership, GM crops 
and so on. The move to this wider agenda was criticised by some members, particularly as Nanjundaswamy 
spent time travelling the globe as farmer representative and activist. The result has been a split in the 
movement, with the Nanjundaswamy faction being associated with a support base in northern Karnataka and 
the so-called Puttaniah faction be linked to southern Karnataka groups (see McHattie 2000 for more details). 
89  Interview, MRC, Bangalore 22 February 2001. 
90  Sharma has deemed the Bt cotton approval ‘the biggest scientific fraud since independence’ and demanded a 
criminal enquiry into the process (see AgBioIndia, 22, 28 April 2003). 
91  ‘Global farmers meet demands “just” agrarian reforms’, Times of India (8 January 1999). 
92  ‘Asian seed meet opens today amid controversy’, Times of India (26 September 2000); ‘Tribunal on corporate 
control over seeds’, Deccan Herald (25 September 2000); ‘Greenpeace to disrupt Asia Pacific Seed Association 
meet, Times of India (13 September 2000). 
93  ‘Campesina strengthens anti-WTO agriforce’, Financial Express (7 October 2000). 
24 
 criticism, with the claims made by its leaders of mass support being questioned (e.g. Assadi 1997; 
McHattie 2000). The brief foray into electoral politics in Karnataka did not result in significant gains, and 
the KRRS soon rejected that route in favour of organised activism outside the electoral arena. In the same 
way, RFSTE and its allies in the NGO movement such as Greenpeace, while making much of the rhetoric 
of peasant voices, have little authority to speak for the vast rural masses, given their limited membership 
base. As with many activist NGOs, in India as elsewhere, personal jealousies, rivalries and competition, 
have plagued both the internal operations of the groups concerned and the relations between them. While 
there have been some dramatic fall outs, with accusations flying in the media, there remains a consistency 
of position, however. And it is probably this that has allowed the sense of an alternative vision to emerge, 
held together by a particular set of commitments, and some common international connections, rather 
than bonded by regular and close connections on a day-to-day basis. 
While strenuously denying any direct connection, the anti-biotechnology groups, some argue, serve 
other interests too. And the anti-GM discourse provides a suitable cover for others. In particular, it is 
argued, that the quite large and powerful pesticide industry has no interest in the advent of Bt 
technologies, which would potentially cut significantly into their market share of pesticide sales.94 In the 
same way some local biotech companies fear early multinational domination of the biotech product 
market, and are quite happy to have regulatory delays for them to catch up. While not wanting to present 
themselves publicly in the debate as a particular, identifiable network of interests, behind-the-scenes 
lobbying offering a “moderate” and “cautious” stance has been noted.  
The controversy generated by Bt cotton has therefore gone far beyond the narrow technicalities 
framed by the regulations and their associated risk assessment approaches. The issue has galvanised a wide 
array of different groups and individuals, and with them a range of different arguments deployed against 
the pro-GM line. This has not been a coherent, unified opposition. Indeed much energy has been invested 
in in-fighting and competition between groups. But the diversity of approaches – from court cases, to 
street demonstrations, to crop burning direct actions, to media and internet information campaigns – have 
perhaps been a contribution to the effectiveness of these efforts in raising a bigger, broader debate.  
Some argue that much of this debate has been based on appropriations of a foreign, European 
discourse, and that such groups have no base or legitimacy in India. The Karnataka Chief Minister, 
S.M. Krishna, identified a ‘diabolical conspiracy by some organisations and vested interests outside India. 
They don’t want a strong nation or a strong scientific community to come up’.95 In the same vein, in an 
op-ed piece, Professor Padmanaban, former IISc director and member of key DBT committees 
comments:  
 
                                                 
94  See, for example, report by the Pesticide Manufacturers Association of India arguing against GM crops, Business 
Line (29 May 2001). See also commentary by Sharad Joshi claiming anti-GM protests are sponsored by the 
industry, Business Line (10 March 1999). 
95  ‘CM warns of plot against biotechnology’, Hindu (8 September 2000). 
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 The state and federal governments have been unnerved by the propaganda, and the response of the 
regulatory agency to government approvals of GM crops is obviously conditioned by the negative 
environment . . . The net result is that all the laboratory marvels remains so and do not make it to the 
field, despite the heroic efforts of scientists and the DBT . . . I do not believe a few more or less trials 
can answer the environment question. Transgenes are a drop in the ocean and nature has its own way 
of equilibriation . . . Misused democratic traditions, miscredited liberalism and misinterpreted 
religious sentiments have unfortunately led to endless debates in India without contributing much to 
the alleviation of human suffering.96 
 
While in part he has a case, he and others miss the point that in the democratic context of India, such a 
cacophony of perspectives must be responded to, lest the formal regulatory process be undermined. 
Those overseeing the regulatory process in government, as well as the industry advocates, are well aware 
of this, and have spent considerable time and resources arguing for the efficacy and trustworthiness of the 
regulatory process. That not everyone quite believes them, or even cares about the formal process, 
becomes more evident when we examine what happens at a more local, state level.   
 
7  Karnataka perspectives 
The earlier sections have looked at how the debate over Bt cotton has been played out at a national level. 
Some actors – such as Professor Nanjundaswamy – have been part of the national, even global, drama, 
but to this point, the concentration has been on how these players and the unfolding of events has 
influenced the regulatory process at the centre, and how different national level discourse coalitions have 
emerged. But how is this played out at state level, and how does the interaction between the states and the 
centre affect the politics of negotiation around regulatory policy? 
When we move to a state level, a complex picture emerges, one that certainly includes many of the 
same actors as at the national level, but in more complex configurations, and with more variations in plot 
lines. While the core network at the centre has held together through the process of “facing the volcano”, 
as Ghosh put it, with stolid determination, this has been more difficult to maintain at state level, at least in 
Karnataka. Here more fractures, and fault lines are evident, and more locally based coalitions and 
networks – which have little chance of finding a foothold in the national context – can have major 
influences over policy positioning and debate. So who are the players in Karnataka? This section identifies 
some of the key players in the debate, and reflects on interviews held with different groups between 2000 
and 2003.  
The cotton farmers of the state will either be the beneficiaries or the victims, depending on one’s 
view of the new technology. In Karnataka cotton is grown largely in the drier part of the state, particularly 
in the central and northern districts. In the 1990s around 6 lakh hectares was planted to cotton each year, 
down from 11.5 lakh hectares in the mid-1950s. Due to yield increases, however, total production in the 
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 state has risen to around 9 lakh bales per annum in the 1990s.97 While many farmers grow some cotton, 
those who make a significant proportion of their income from cotton tend to be more prosperous 
farmers, able to afford the often expensive inputs. They also tend to have relatively larger field sizes, and 
employ labour on their farm for basic agricultural operations. The Bt cotton trial sites were located where 
seed companies have long had seed multiplication facilities, and, according to Shiva et al. (1999), the 
chosen trial farmers included those who had had previous associations with Monsanto in this regard. The 
relatively richer, “middle class” farmers are also the core supporters too of the KRRS, and the dryland belt 
of these districts is the area where Nanjundaswamy’s faction of the KRRS gains most of its support. Thus 
in the attempts to burn the trial site crops in 1998–99, the KRRS leaders were able to persuade farmers in 
Bellary and Raichur to comply with their demands.  
On GM crops there is clearly no uniformity of position among such farmers. Illegal Bt cotton was 
available in the state during 2001–02 and some estimate that around 10 per cent of the cotton area was 
planted to Bt cotton acquired through informal trade.98 Much of this planting was done by relatively rich 
farmers – ironically the main constituency of the KRRS.99 Unlike the big expose in Gujarat this was 
quietly ignored by the authorities, in the hope that a more formal approval would come the following year. 
This indeed did occur and MMB supplied Bt cotton in 2002–03 to cover nearly 20000 acres. This was 
supplied mainly to clusters around the earlier Monsanto trial sites. Monsanto were clear that the trials were 
a prelude to the commercial release and that they afforded the opportunity to educate the farmers about 
Bt cotton during that period.  
The release of Bt cotton in the state provoked more protests from KRRS and Nanjundaswamy. A 
major rally at the Monsanto Research Centre in Bangalore was held in August 2002, and the Minister of 
Agriculture was called to address the protestors. He banned the sale of Bt cotton seed for a period and 
proclaimed that full scale commercial release had not occurred, and that it remained only on a trial basis.100 
Attempts at crop burning during 2002 had mixed results as before, with some farmers accepting 
compensation from KRRS protestors for the public destruction of their Bt cotton crop, while others 
firmly refused such advances and called in the police. The degree to which Bt cotton will have a major 
impact on the cotton farming economy of the state will only be known in a few years time, however, when 
more farmers, beyond the trial clusters have tried the product under a variety of conditions, including high 
bollworm infestations (which did not occur in the first season due to widespread drought). 
                                                 
97  Government of Karnataka (2000). Karnataka Agricultural Profile, April 2000. Karnataka State Department of 
Agriculture: Bangalore. 
98  Interview, Karnataka Seed Association, Bangalore, February 2002. 
99  This contradiction is often pointed to by critics of KRRS. The high profile anti-GM campaign they argue is 
more for international consumption and about Nanjundaswamy’s international profile as farmer activist than 
local concerns. Farmers in the core KRRS districts have been the main purchasers of Monsanto’s (Cargill) 
maize hybrids for years. They are not surprisingly also potentially key consumers of Bt cotton. Outside the anti-
GM activism, however, the KRRS focuses more on conventional farmer demands, pushing government to 
maintain subsidies, ensure electricity for pump sets and so on.  
100  For example Koujalgi banned the sale of Bt cotton seeds in response to a KRRS rally in August 2002 (see 
Deccan Herald, 9 August). He was also reported as saying that ‘Government has not given an official go-ahead 
for growing genetically modified Bt cotton’ (Deccan Herald, 15 December 2002). 
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 In state electoral politics the views of the farming community, or at least that relatively privileged 
sections of it, cannot be ignored. The KRRS indeed built its support on that basis, arguing the case for the 
farmers in the face of threats for what they deemed were “anti-farmer” policies of the state government, 
both in its Janata Dal incarnation and with the return of the Congress in 1999. The fine balance of 
electoral politics in the state is determined critically by the rural vote, and in particular by the influence of 
the farmer lobby. Many Members of the Legislative Assembly identify themselves as farmers (as well as 
being lawyers, business people and so on), and are keenly aware that their economic and political 
advancement has been on the back of generous support from successive governments in terms of 
subsidies on irrigation water, electricity, fertiliser and so on. Even a decade after the formal announcement 
of the economic liberalisation policy in 1991, the agriculture sector remains relatively untouched,101 and 
the relatively well-off sector of the farming population continue to reap the benefits. How the 
biotechnology debate is seen in this regard is complex and is beyond the scope of this discussion. Until 
recently in Karnataka successive Ministers of Agriculture have been circumspect about supporting Bt 
cotton, usually hedging their bets and deferring to expert panels (as with Byre Gowda in November 1998) 
and commissions (as with Jayachandra in 2000). Only since the forthright support of Bt cotton offered by 
the Karnataka Agricultural Commission in late 2000, has the tide turned, and the then Minister of 
Agriculture advocated Bt cotton as a solution for the state’s ailing cotton economy.102 However, this has 
again shifted as the populist Minister, Koujalgi, from 2002 has proved more circumspect in his 
statements.103 
This reticence about outwardly supporting Bt cotton and biotechnology more broadly derives not 
only from the sensitivity towards the electorally important farming community, but also in relation to the 
confusion over responsibilities for biotechnology regulation between the centre and the states. On several 
occasions Ministers in Karnataka have vented their anger publicly at what they have regarded as the 
inappropriate – and potentially unconstitutional – way that the DBT at the centre has gone about the 
regulatory process, without engaging the states in any substantive discussion or involvement in the 
decision process, despite agriculture being a “state subject”. For example, the Minister of Agriculture for 
Karnataka claimed he had only learned of the approval of the trials from the media. Although he had been 
informed by letter, this had been filed and not brought to any senior officer’s attention. This is put down 
to, variously, ‘bureaucratic incompetence of a useless department [DBT]’ or ‘typical Delhi arrogance’ or 
‘the usual antagonism between the BJP [at the centre] and the Congress [in the state]’. As many 
                                                 
101  Although budget speeches in the period from 2001 have increasingly chipped away at the agricultural subsidy 
regime. The degree to which state governments are able to respond to these suggestions from the centre is of 
course another matter. 
102  ‘Bt cotton trials launched in state: following suggestion of Karnataka Agricultural Commission’, Hindu 
(29 October 2000). Also ‘Karnataka allows field trials of Bt cotton by Mayhco’, Economic Times (31 August 2000) 
[in 85 ha in 14 sites in districts of Bellary, Devangare, Koppal, Raichur and Shimoga]. See also reports on the 
Commission findings: ‘Farm panel submits reports’, Hindu (27 December 2000); ‘Agro panel favours state Bt 
cotton trials’, Asian Age (27 December 2000). 
103  See Deccan Herald (15 December 2002); Times of India (14 December 2002). 
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 commentators have observed, the Indian federal system is a complex, and often fragile, political balancing 
act, plagued by bureaucratic and administrative complexity (Jenkins 2002; Harriss 1999).  
It is not only the politicians who feel such frustrations, but also Department of Agriculture civil 
servants and scientists based at the state agricultural universities, who equally feel that their valid, local 
expertise and practical experience has been by-passed by a high-handed, detached, Delhi-centred 
regulatory process, dominated by a closed clique of scientists and bureaucrats, with few links to field 
realities. Thus one University of Agricultural Sciences (Bangalore) scientist commented:  
 
DBT is under a lot of pressure. Monsanto is putting pressure as are others. This is why they don’t 
want the state agricultural universities involved in the biosafety regulation process. They feel we 
might be too thorough. We have experts in many fields. It is easier to get past bureaucrats as they 
don’t have the relevant scientific expertise.104 
 
With the intervention of the ICAR in the process at the centre, however, the dynamic changed somewhat 
from 2002 when the University of Agricultural Sciences (UAS) at Dharwad became involved in the trials, 
and there was more of a sense of inclusion in the process, as certain sections of the state-level agricultural 
science community became coopted.105 As a Monsanto official put it: ‘Before there was confusion. DBT 
thought they should manage everything . . . DBT learned the lesson the hard way. Now they are playing 
safe’.106 
Others are more sanguine, arguing that, in practice, despite all the hot air about the regulatory 
process, it will be the practitioners on the ground who will have to see all this through. When the dust has 
settled, they can get on with their job. The DBT has no field capacity at all, they point out, and with staff 
in every district, the Department of Agriculture in Karnataka has a much more substantial influence on 
what actually happens on the ground. Others point out, particularly in the light of the widespread 
adoption of Bt cotton seed prior to formal regulatory approval, that the possibilities of regulating the 
highly complex seed bulking and distribution industry in India is effectively impossible. Farmers know the 
brands they like and will pay appropriate premiums and it is through the market that quality is regulated. 
However, intervening in this market on wider issues of biosafety and so on is seen to be pie in the sky. A 
representative from the Karnataka Seed Association put in bluntly: ‘There are hundreds of seeds sellers in 
Karnataka. Regulation is an impossibility’.107 
A certain scepticism about the trial process is also regularly voiced (see above). In the end, the 
argument goes, policies and regulatory decisions only matter in relation to what can be done on the 
ground, and that will be down to those who are in the field – the farmers, the department and the input 
supply companies. For many the trials are essentially symbolic, part of the ritual of the regulatory process 
                                                 
104  Interview UAS Bangalore, 22 February 2001. 
105  UAS Dharwad received a Rs5crore grant from the Karnataka government in 2001, while the UAS Bangalore 
received a hefty US$40000 grant from Monsanto in 2002 (Deccan Herald, 30 September 2002). 
106  Interview, MRC Bangalore 22 February 2001. 
107  Interview, Bangalore February 2002. 
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 designed by the centre, essentially to respond to the bureaucratic and political requirements of the centre. 
At the state level, these were less relevant, and carried less bureaucratic or political importance. The issue 
would be resolved, informants suggested, not through a highly contested trial process, but by the 
acceptance or otherwise by farmers. Many saw the whole issue being blown out of proportion. As a senior 
Department of Agriculture official argued: ‘Bt will not be a big thing here. Yes, some will adopt it, others 
will not. We have other more important things to get on with’.108 
However, there are problems with this laissez faire approach. As the same commentators pointed 
out, what is problematic is that despite the large staff complement, the capacity for overseeing biosafety 
regulations by the department is very limited, and presents the major problem which seems to have been 
little addressed. A similar viewpoint was expressed by a number of faculty at UAS (Bangalore) who, during 
2001, were furious that they had not been involved in the design and monitoring of the field trials: ‘How 
do they expect us to believe their trials if we are not allowed to be involved?’, one said. Another went on 
to complain about how local scientists are coopted by DBT into the monitoring of existing trials, and 
asked ‘What can you say about a trial which you visit for a few hours, under the close guidance of a 
company official? You can’t say anything. It is a waste of time’. Another commented: ‘You are well treated 
when you go to see these trials. In a group of seven who is going to complain? We sign the paper and go. 
It’s not an effective or transparent process’. Another observed: ‘The trial programme deliberately avoided 
the University. They feared a more rigorous experimental approach’.109 
Other scientists in the more basic science institutions – notably the Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc) 
and the National Centre for Biological Sciences (NCBS) – have less to say about the regulatory process 
and Bt cotton in particular. Most work at the molecular and biochemical level and generally are somewhat 
confused about all the furore about genetic engineering, it being what they do on a day to day basis in 
their labs. At IISc in particular there was a sense that the debate had got out of hand, and that there was 
little that a scientist could offer to it. The best thing to do was to lie low and keep out of it all, and hope 
that it would blow over without any too damaging consequences for their research funding. The whole 
controversy about the siting of the Monsanto Research Centre on the IISc campus had put many off 
stepping into the fray.110 With a few exceptions (notably former IISc director Professor G. Padmanaban 
and his colleague Professor Sharat Chandra), there has been little commentary from the elite Bangalore 
science community on the crop biotechnology issue. Yet many of that same group are engaged in other 
ways, particularly in the extensive committee structure of DBT at the centre, and some can be seen as key 
members of the core network highlighted above. Their silence on Bt cotton in the Karnataka context is 
telling therefore, given their broader commitment to biotechnology developments.  
One scientist, however, who has not been shy of providing a fairly relentless commentary has been 
C.S. Prakash, previously of the UAS, Bangalore and now of Tuskagee university in the US. Through his 
website, regular contributions to the Indian press, and during his visits to Bangalore he has kept up a 
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30 
 committed, single-minded evangelical position in support of biotechnology, and Bt cotton in particular.111 
As a non-resident Indian (NRI) he holds a particular status – at one time insider at another outsider, at 
one time revered and respected, and at another easily dismissed as out of touch. Sceptical views are often 
expressed about C.S. Prakash, but one cannot deny his commitment and enthusiasm. He is joined, but 
perhaps with lesser zeal, by other NRIs, including Ganesh Kishore (ex of IISc and subsequently with 
Monsanto in the US and more recently an independent consultant in the US linked to the Bangalore start-
up company, Metahelix), Shantu Shantaram (formerly University of Bangalore, latterly with Syngenta in 
Switzerland and with links to IFPRI); all of whom on various occasions have presented their views on 
biotechnology, both to senior state level policymakers, and to a broader public through the media. This 
NRI connection has been formalised through the efforts of Prakash who has attempted to convene a 
grouping of such people, under the K-GANGA umbrella, launched by the Chief Minister in August 2000, 
and recognised in the Millennium Biotechnology Policy of the state (March 2001) as a key advisory group.  
While presenting their position as progressive, industry friendly and in line with the pro reform, 
investment oriented policies of the state government, the NRI players remain regarded with some 
suspicion by elements of the more local business and industry elite. In the Bangalore context at least, the 
division is not simply between those who are pro- or anti-GM crops (read Bt cotton), as at the national 
level, and as in much of the international debate, but a more varied set of options are presented. Many 
influential local business players simply do not trust the likes of Monsanto. They are seen certainly as 
serious competitors, and ones who have the capital might and global reach to eliminate any smaller player 
at a stroke. But they also have been seen as a public relations disaster area, undermining real potentials for 
the sustained growth of a biotechnology industry and associated inward investment into the state (and 
indeed into their own companies) by fomenting what is seen as an unnecessary and misdirected furore, in 
the pursuit of their single product. These commentators, then, do not frankly care about Bt cotton, but 
worry seriously about the repercussions that a negative image of biotechnology might have on commercial 
prospects for biotechnology more broadly. As one leading Bangalore-based biotech entrepreneur put it: 
‘We need to distance ourselves from Monsanto. They have really muddied the waters. Monsanto has 
messed it up for a lot of people’.112 A Seed Association official argued that ‘Monsanto put back biotech by 
a decade’. 113 While this view is shared by some of the other multinationals – who also have a fairly dim 
view of Monsanto – they are seen to have other options, and what happens in Karnataka – or to some 
extent even India – is relatively unimportant in a global multi-billion dollar business. It is the more local 
industrialists and entrepreneurs who are building new concerns, through complex negotiations with 
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 venture capitalists and private loans who see the long term risks to their commercial futures of getting 
swamped by the Bt cotton controversy. For them, delinking from that debate is seen as key.114 
In Bangalore such local industry players have significant – and increasing – political clout and 
influence (Scoones 2003). While they may not have the electoral base, and solid party connections of the 
farming lobby, they are part of an emerging policy elite that cuts across industry, government, and the civil 
service. An alliance between such local industrialists and the “new breed” of politicians and civil servants 
can be discerned in Karnataka, particularly in the post-1999 period of the S.M. Krishna administration, 
where the projection of a modern, forward looking, business friendly state is very much part of the 
political image. The appointment of Kiran Muzumdar Shaw, MD of BioCon a successful Bangalore 
biotech business to chair the Chief Minister’s Vision Group on biotechnology was no surprise. Building 
on the success of Bangalore in the IT revolution, so the rhetoric goes, the biotech revolution must follow. 
Following closely in the footsteps of the earlier IT kings, Narayan Murthy and Premji, Muzumdar Shaw 
combined the right qualities of good connections, a successful business track record, and is an articulate 
and influential policy player, increasingly on the national and international stage through her work with the 
CII as chair of their biotechnology committee. Ensuring the IT to BT connection was part of the 
Karnataka model was confirmed with the location of the policy development in the Department of 
Information Technology (now IT and Biotechnology), under the capable hands of a civil servant known 
for thoroughness and effectiveness, as well as close connections with the Chief Minister.  
The Karnataka state biotechnology Vision Group had no representatives from the agricultural sector, 
and the whole process distanced itself from any association with agriculture, Bt cotton and all the difficult 
controversy that had been raging for several years. The only concession in the final policy document was a 
Rs5 crore grant to the University of Agricultural Sciences at Dharwad for a new crop biotechnology unit. 
Dharwad being in northern Karnataka is as one person put it ‘far enough away from Bangalore’.115 Rather 
than locating state biotechnology efforts across the conventional line ministries (agriculture, health etc.), 
where particular bureaucratic politics prevail, a relatively new, nimble, unfettered department was chosen – 
one that identifies itself as a facilitator of business interventions rather than an implementor itself. This 
signalled a new style of bureaucratic politics for biotechnology in the state, one based on a discourse 
coalition very different to that found at the centre. As a member of the Vision Group put it ‘The process 
was steered to focus on business opportunities, not agriculture. The policy is for corporates and 
business’.116 
Thus the core network and the formal regulatory process looks quite distant from the standpoint of 
Bangalore, rather than in Delhi. Indeed an emergent network in Bangalore seems to be taking a different 
tack, one based on getting investment rolling, contracts secured, product development processes up and 
running and worrying about regulation later, or if at all – perhaps through avoiding the thorny issues of 
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 field trials and environmental release altogether through a focus on bioinformatics, genomics and a lab or 
silicon-based contract research approach (Scoones 2002b). In the words of perhaps the leading local 
advocate of the biotech industry and chair of the Vision Group, Kiran Muzumdar Shaw: ‘There are no ifs 
and buts in the race to biotech. India must be a global biopower in the next ten years, and Karnataka the 
showcase’.117 Many in Bangalore regard the Delhi bureaucracy as a major hurdle to this vision. One senior 
Government of Karnataka civil servant argued: ‘DBT is a problem. The regulatory process is too 
cumbersome. We should be able to deal with things here: we have all the requisite expertise’.118 
The lack of outward support for the DBT and its regulatory approach introduces more complexity 
and uncertainty into the process. Implementation becomes delayed, and so more measured and tentative, 
as other voices of doubt and caution come into view. Despite the formal authority that the centre has over 
the regulatory process, there is little that they can do to prevent such alternative directions developing at 
the state level. Court orders, police protection, media rebuttals are all perfectly legitimate responses. But in 
the end what appears to have happened is that in the Karnataka setting, where contexts, actors and 
interests – and so politics – are different, the constrained, delineated and highly technical response to the 
regulatory challenge has been deemed, from a variety of angles, and from a variety of perspectives, to be 
inadequate, and inoperable. 
 
8  Questioning regulatory expertise and procedure 
The debates about Bt cotton have raised, then, a series of questions about both the content of regulatory 
decisions, and the process by which they have been made. Three almost parallel debates have occurred, 
each highlighting different, but equally fundamental, questions. The first lies within the domain of 
scientific discourse, and focuses on facts, data and measurement issues surrounding the risk assessment 
procedures. The second debate is far broader in scope, and goes beyond the more narrow questions of 
assessing risk, to raise broader political, economic and moral questions about the nature of the technology 
in question. Third, questions are raised about the use of expertise as part of regulatory procedure, pointing 
to issues of transparency and inclusion in the process. This questioning has come from a range of 
different quarters. While the vocal opposition groups have pushed the debate into the media, others have 
raised similar issues in other fora, and in somewhat more measured tones. This section examines the 
specifics of this questioning, and asks whether this adds up to a broader challenge to the regulatory 
process as a whole. 
 
                                                 
117  Speech at Asia Society Conference, Bangalore 13 March 2001. See also Financial Express (15 April 2002): 
‘Bangalore all set to become biotech hub’, Economic Times (15 April 2002); ‘Karnataka biotech sector worth 
Rs 700 crore’, Hindu (16 April 2002), and report of joint survey by Karnataka Vision Group and CII which 
estimates that Karnataka was likely to attract Rs300 crore in 2002–03 as biotech investment. The report also 
claims that the state employs 5,000 people in the sector, of whom 3,500 are scientists (Business Standard, 16 April 
2002). 
118  Interview Bangalore, 6 March 2001. 
33 
 8.1 Contests over science 
As we have seen the regulatory process over the past eight years or so dealing with Bt cotton has 
addressed a number of issues through a combination large and small-scale field trials and laboratory 
assessments. The field trials have focused largely on issues of agronomic performance, although there has 
also been monitoring of pollen escape and assessments of potential impacts on biodiversity. The 
laboratory assessments have focused on safety tests including those for allergenicity and toxicity. The 
procedures for these assessments are laid down in the regulations and associated guidelines, and have been 
confirmed by the RCGM, sometimes with marginal adaptations and extensions. The procedures follow 
those which have been pursued elsewhere, particularly in the US where transgenic assessments have 
proceeded further and earlier than anywhere else. In November 2002, DBT Director Dr S.R. Rao was 
quoted as saying that ‘transgenic crops were . . . absolutely safe for human consumption’.119 
Despite the apparent scientific consensus on the approach, there have been a number of questions 
raised about the chosen approaches. Do they really highlight the full range of potential risks, or by their 
design do they actually ignore areas of uncertainty by choosing particular temporal or spatial scales, for 
instance? When probed regulators – both bureaucrats and scientists serving on the committees – are quick 
to agree with this proposition. Of course, they say, our assessments are only able to look at relatively 
short-term impacts, and, of course, they have to be concentrated in artificially small spatial scales (because 
otherwise the requirements for containment and pre-release testing would not be met). And, they point 
out, in any case longer term and broader scale impacts will be picked up through monitoring later on. The 
current procedures, they argue, have proved sufficient for the USDA/FDA, and the Indian regulations are 
even stricter, so what burden of proof do people require? They point (selectively it must be admitted) to 
the now voluminous published literature on Bt cotton in the US (and now increasingly China; see the 
much distributed paper by Huang et al. 2002 for example) as evidence for how this technology has been 
proven both safe and beneficial to farmers and the environment again and again. 
Most critics would also recognise the practical limitations of any risk assessment, but perhaps object 
more to the sense that any debate about experimental design and analysis is not countenanced. Take the 
issue of field trial size and the degree to which one acre plots are sufficient. When this was raised in a 
discussion piece in a special issue of Current Science (Bharathan 2000), none of the respondents (from 
DBT, Mayhco etc.) reacted to this particular issue. This despite the fact that there is a much wider debate 
about ecological risk assessment for transgenics, where the conventional field trial approach adopted in 
India has been widely questioned (Scoones 2002a). A UAS scientist in Bangalore echoed many in sharing 
his scepticism of the trials: ‘These are not long term trials’,120 he said, ‘You cannot tell much in one or two 
years . . . But you cannot recall a crop once it is released. We need to rethink soon’. DBT officials agree. 
One observed frankly: ‘We don’t know how to do long-term safety assessments. We cannot know what 
will happen in 20 or 30 years time’.121 But the argument that it is impossible to deal with long term effects 
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 in this sort of assessment while true, is surely inadequate to assuage fears and doubts. A very real concern 
about the impact of Bt cotton technology on pest resistance dynamics is raised by many critics, again 
based on a wider and now substantial and well documented debate about the potential impacts on pest 
ecology of Bt technologies (Mayer 2002). Drawing parallels with elsewhere is clearly inadequate, given the 
particularities of the Indian pest complex, and the very different spatial patterning of the agroecological 
landscape in Indian cotton growing areas. And, as the UAS professor noted, there is no going back once 
transgenic material is released.  
The way the regulations have been framed, essentially ignoring – or putting off – consideration of 
such wider ecological impacts, is perhaps a reflection of both their origins and the current emphasis of 
regulatory expertise. As already discussed the regulations were generated with limited input from 
agricultural scientists and perhaps no input from ecologists. They reflected an emerging consensus on 
what should be done which had emerged in the developing world in the 1980s, and had been heavily 
influenced by industry concerns and, in particular the US approach to product assessment, based on such 
principles as “substantial equivalence” (Newell 2002; Scoones 2002a).  
The advisory committees that have overseen their implementation have been dominated, as we have 
seen, by biologists largely working at the molecular level, whose interest in and knowledge of complex 
ecological processes is, as they readily admit, negligible. So when issues of pest resistance are brought up, 
in addition to talking vaguely about principles of “integrated pest management” – an emerging catch-all 
mantra that allows transgenic solutions to be packaged with all other pest control solutions, chemical and 
non-chemical – the focus is on further genetic engineering solutions: seeking out and cloning new Bt 
toxins, stacking genes together, working on mid-gut receptor pathways and so on. It is not that these are 
inappropriate or invalid solutions, but the point is simply that the framing of the debate is such that other 
issues are cut out, or at least downplayed. This means that the scientific debate around Bt is conducted in a 
particular, and highly fragmented way. Those with access to the regulatory system frame the issue in one 
way (largely around genetic, molecular and chemical issues), and in so doing blackbox a whole range of 
uncertainties.  
By contrast, those critics who engage in the scientific discussions around regulations open up these 
black boxes and raise questions about uncertainties not considered – or at least dismissed and put off – by 
the regulators. By failing to engage the critics – and this is partly due to a simple lack of expertise in the 
core science-policy network dealing with regulation at the centre which can address these issues in 
anything like a substantial and convincing manner – a sense of disengagement, distance and distrust with 
the regulatory process emerges. In interviews this was very tangibly expressed among agricultural and 
ecological scientists who, to their mind, had been excluded from the regulatory discussions, and whose 
very genuine concerns were not being heard. 
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 8.2 Contests over values and politics 
The current regulatory process then certainly finds it difficult to deal with dissenting science, or science 
that does not fit within the regulatory frame, but it finds it even more difficult to deal with broader issues 
of values and politics as an explicit part of the regulatory process. Such issues are deemed to be firmly 
outside the remit of the regulatory process. As one senior scientist put it: ‘We deal with science, facts. We 
cannot mix this up with religion and politics. Those issues are important but they need to be dealt with 
elsewhere’.122 By demarcating a very narrow area for the deliberation of regulatory issues – around, as 
discussed above, a very specific set of scientific issues, the scope of which is even disputed by other 
scientists with different disciplinary traditions – the regulators hope to keep the decision process on track, 
and by claiming it to be exclusively “science-based”, allowing a certain type of expertise to be granted the 
authority to decide. 
But, as we have seen, maintaining this dividing line between the technical and the political has been a 
hard task over the last years, and, despite the attempts made by the DBT, members of the scientific 
community involved as regulators and industry representatives with an interest in the regulatory system, 
this has been very difficult to uphold in practice. It is clear to everyone – including, at least off the record, 
those members of the core network at the heart of regulatory decision making – that this is a highly 
political, value-laden question, and that the scientific questions are just one, unquestionably important, 
part of the debate.  
At every turn those opposing Bt cotton have raised these wider questions, and through effective 
campaign work and a media eager for stories, they have managed to raise the wider debate – about 
multinational domination, about globalisation, about farmers’ rights and so on. Yet, without a forum to 
deliberate on such issues in the context of regulatory decisions about biotechnology, there is an evident 
impasse. The regulators admit that such issues are important (even if they violently disagree with the 
statements being made by the opponents), yet are not able to admit that they are part of the overall 
equation, and, inevitably influence the outcome of regulatory decisions, even if only indirectly. As the 
debate continues, the insistence that all the decisions are simply “science-based” is becoming more and 
more hollow. The broader political context within which any decision about approval of Bt cotton or any 
other transgenic product must be important, whether in relation to national media coverage, electoral 
support in certain areas, opposition political pressures, trade considerations with Europe, the US or China, 
or whatever.  Yet, such issues remain implicit and are not seen as germane to the regulatory decision. 
 
8.3 Contests over procedure and process 
Many of the disputes over the regulation of agricultural biotechnology come down in the end to contests 
over the regulatory procedure and process. There will inevitably be disputes about facts, measurements, 
values, politics and so on. These occur among scientists as much as they do between proponents and 
opponents of genetic engineering technologies. The issue at hand is whether the current regulatory system 
                                                 
122  Interview, IISc, February 2001. 
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 can deal with such disputes and develop decisions that command broad approval and respect: not 
necessarily, or ever, consensus. 
Many people have raised both publicly and informally in interviews their concerns with the current 
composition of the regulatory committees convened by the DBT. As one sceptic pointed out: 
‘Biotechnologists don’t speak against biotechnology’.123 The committees are seen to be composed largely 
of a relatively narrow clique of scientists, who themselves are perhaps excessively reliant on the largesse of 
the DBT – and in some cases commercial biotechnology companies. While this type of bias is unproven, 
the claim that the disciplinary bias – and the consequent ignoring of certain issues – is easier to uphold. 
But how wide a grouping should a committee of this sort include? DBT officials argue that the RCGM 
and Monitoring and Evaluation committee has a purely scientific function. While they may concede to 
expanding the scientific coverage to include agronomists, breeders or ecologists for instance, the idea of 
extending the regulatory deliberations to a wider remit is not contemplated. 
Another complaint about the current process focuses less on the composition of the committees, but 
more on their functioning and style. This comes from both outsiders and insiders to the process. The pro-
Bt cotton Indian Farmers Federation complained that:  
 
The permission raj starts with the District Level Committee . . . It is very difficult to comprehend 
what has the Collector, Chief Secretary or a Minister to do with Biotechnology! . . . MNCs are 
expected to go round the committees, the Babus and the politicians to get approval . . . Let’s face it. 
India can never be an industrial superpower and has missed the genetic revolution.124  
 
Even with relatively few applications being presented to the DBT there is already a lot of paperwork, and 
the opportunities for detailed examination of particular cases is very limited. Short, rushed meetings where 
decisions must be made are not ideal for chewing over the complexities of risk assessment. In practice, as 
discussed earlier, much is decided in advance, through informal interactions and intensive preparation by 
the DBT member secretary. This may be an inevitable consequence of lack of time and funds, and the 
limits of bureaucratic and administrative procedure, but it does suggest that the deployment of expertise 
(of whatever form) might be improved. As one senior scientists with long involvement with DBT pointed 
out: ‘DBT has plenty of regulations. And they are very good. But there is no way they can be enforced’.125 
If the committee members themselves have doubts about the process, what about the broader public who 
have to trust the outcomes?  
The same applies to the monitoring and evaluation procedures for field trials, where particularly 
incisive criticism came from some scientists who had been coopted onto M and E field visits (see above). 
Others have criticised the field trial process as untransparent and secretive, with the lack of data disclosure 
                                                 
123  Interview, UAS, 22 February 2001. 
124  Indian Farmers Federation (P. Chengal Reddy and Dr J.R. Murthy): ‘Betrayal of Indian Farmers!’, 29 July 2001, 
posted on MonsantoIndia site, www.monsantoindia.com/news 
125  Interview, IISc, 12 January 2001. 
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 undermining trust in the findings.126 Echoing the sentiments of others, one senior ICAR official 
commented:  ‘what can you tell about agronomic performance from a one day visit to a site. It’s not 
appropriate at all’.127 If, as everyone agrees, not all uncertainties can be ironed out in any risk assessment 
procedure, based on field trials and lab assessments, then careful monitoring will continue to be an 
important part of regulatory oversight. Yet the current system appears to be inadequate, even on the 
limited scale (a few hundred trials in selected locations for a few products) that it is being conducted at the 
moment. 
The early resistance of DBT and MMB to allow agricultural universities to be formally involved in 
the trial process certainly irked many, and simply added to the distrust already building, among a group of 
essentially supportive scientific colleagues. This has to some extent been rectified with the involvement of 
ICAR from 2001. However, many interpret this move cynically, and protestors demand more involvement 
and transparency.  
The claims and counter-claims made by various protagonists in 2002 and 2003 about the success or 
otherwise of Bt cotton in different parts of the country is simply witness to the fact that no-one believes 
anyone else’s data. It is open season to report big claims on the basis of short visits, video testimonies and 
limited surveys, in the hope that the media will pick up the story and report it. That some reports, even in 
apparently reputed international journals, are so obviously biased has annoyed even industry officials who 
see such efforts as undermining any possibility of making a pro-GM case (see above).  
As many pointed out in interviews, issues of trust, legitimacy and authority are paramount in the 
regulatory process. And these do not seem to be rated highly at the moment, by a wide range of people, 
both those notionally for and against Bt cotton. This is potentially a major problem, and suggests the need 
to rethink in fairly fundamental ways the approach to regulation being taken. While DBT claims they are 
being ‘as transparent as they need to be’, while strictly correct in relation to the current regulations, this is 
clearly not enough, and many players from all camps are demanding more. In an editorial, the Financial 
Express argued that ‘the secrecy and bureaucratic infighting which plagued Bt cotton approval, and 
needlessly delayed commercialisation, left critics and proponents of GM technology, as well as the public, 
wondering about the efficiency of Indian regulators’. The piece went on to argue for putting data in the 
public domain, as ‘the success or failure of any technological application must be dictated by individual 
freedom and market economics not controversy and doubt’.128 
The argument for openness and transparency can of course be argued in a number of ways, 
reflecting, inevitably, the positions and interests of the commentators. A number of industry players argue 
that the current centralised process overseen by DBT is just too slow, cumbersome, confusing and non-
transparent, and that it should be handed over to the states to oversee regulatory approvals, under an 
umbrella legislative framework and national oversight. As one commentator put it: ‘We started with the 
best rules and regulations you can imagine. They did not miss a point. But now it is time to rationalise, and 
                                                 
126  See ‘Make field trial results of GM crops public’, Financial Express (18 November 2002). 
127  Interview, Delhi, 2 April 2001. 
128  Financial Express (7 November 2002). 
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 choose from the longer checklist’.129 This arrangement, they say, would cut red tape, speed up regulatory 
decisions, and allow local concerns to be more easily accommodated. Some, particularly from the NGO 
community, regard this route to be a recipe for the capture of the regulatory process by well-connected 
commercial interests, and for new forms of secrecy to creep in. Particular fears are expressed at handing 
over regulatory authority to the state level where patronage networks and interest based politics operate to 
much effect.  
Others argue that the particular issues of agricultural biotechnology need special attention, and that 
the regulatory role should be taken over by the agricultural bureaucracy, who have long experience of 
approving the import of plant products, carrying out field trials and undertaking seed and other 
certification requirements. The large ICAR network, they point out, including the state agricultural 
universities allows for a decentralised approach which links the states and the centre in a more 
coordinated fashion. As one senior ICAR official commented: ‘Transgenic plants should come under 
ICAR. The biotech people don’t know field conditions and agronomy issues’.130  But others point to the 
vested interests of the ICAR network in this. How can they take over regulation when they too are 
producing the technology often in competition with the private sector.  
Others argue for a fundamental opening up of the national process, removing the regulatory function 
from DBT, who, they argue cannot both promote and regulate an industry at the same time. 
M.S. Swaminathan for example has long argued for a more strategic national policy, and an independent 
regulatory commission.131 Such a solution would potentially allow deliberation on both scientific issues, 
but also broader economic, political, and if needed moral issues, with appropriate forms of expertise – 
including those of farmers and “the public” – represented. As the chair of the new Karnataka 
Biotechnology Council argued: ‘Once you make things known to people, then regulation becomes 
secondary’.132 Others similarly have argued for a more cautious approach (cf. Iyengar and Lalitha 2002)133. 
Such an arrangement would, advocates hope, command broader and deeper respect and trust, and, in the 
end, would serve the interests of society better, in a more democratic and open way. 
 
9  Negotiating regulations: future perspectives 
Regulating biotechnology is not a straightforward task. As the Bt cotton case shows, it is the politics of 
negotiations rather than the linear approach to science-based decision-making that dominates. Different 
sites and different styles of negotiation occur depending on the political context. Contests over science 
and facts, over values and political meaning, and over processes and procedures have dominated the 
                                                 
129  Interview, TERI, Delhi, 29 March 2001. 
130  Interview, Delhi, 2 April 2001. 
131  See ‘MSS calls for national policy on GM crops’, Business Line (13 January 2003). Also Business Standard 
(26 November 2002). See also Chennai Declaration, released following the MSSRF dialogue on the legacy of 
Watson and Crick: 50 years later, Hindu (13 January 2003). 
132  Interview, V. Prakash, CFTRI, 16 April 2001. 
133  See Financial Express (9 December 2002). 
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 Indian experience. Whether in the Delhi-based committees or in the machinations of the policy process at 
a state level, a variety of actors and interests are involved.  
While the administrative narrative of regulation suggests there are distinct decision points made 
according to standardised and objective criteria, this is clearly not borne out in practice. There is not a 
single regulatory decision, but much more of an ongoing process. This is wholly compatible with a 
precautionary approach, now widely accepted in Europe for example, where iterative learning and 
reflection result in changing regulatory positions. This continues to the post-release stage, with “market 
stage precaution” (Levidow et al. 1999) being the guiding principle for continued monitoring and 
evaluation. In a precautionary approach issues of trust, legitimacy and an openness about what is within 
the regulatory remit is crucial. One reading of the Indian case would suggest that India, having faced a 
crisis of legitimacy and trust in its regulatory procedures, is likely to go down the European route of 
embracing a more precautionary approach, and with this a more inclusive and participatory approach to 
the framing and implementing of regulations. But this may be too simple a story-line. The conditions and 
contexts of India are very different to those of Europe in the 1990s, and a different set of complexities 
need to be envisaged. 
Nevertheless, building confidence in and legitimacy for regulatory decisions is clearly essential.134 
This needs to be among a range of different groupings, and not necessarily the “usual suspects” directly 
involved in the debate and often repeating rather tired pro and anti-GM slogans. The biotechnology 
debate touches a much wider set of issues than often assumed, and, for the agricultural sector, suggests 
the need for a debate which goes to the heart of the agricultural and development policy. Unlike in 
Europe, this is an issue of basic livelihoods for 700 million people who to some degree are reliant on 
agriculture. Clearly as currently framed – around a rather narrow conception of biosafety derived from 
European and North American concerns – the regulatory debate remains very limited. With all the focus 
on the supposed health and environmental consequences of adopting Bt cotton taking much of the 
attention of activists and proponents alike the bigger picture may be being missed. While some have 
correctly highlighted the importance of looking at food and farming futures as central to the 
biotechnology debate,135 this has not been at the centre of much of the discussion framed as it has been 
“back end” risk assessment issues of trial results, pre-set regulatory criteria and so on. Meanwhile 
decisions are made for example to recast public agricultural research priorities in a major way, with ICAR 
announcing that its targets  now are aimed  at export crops,  rather than those of national  food security.136 
                                                 
134  This is widely agreed. See for example comment piece by Jaraim Ramesh in India Today (23 July 2001) where he 
notes: ‘The only way to inspire confidence is to make all results of the trials under Indian conditions public and 
have them subjected to scientific peer review. Even though highly complex scientific issues are involved, the 
debate has to be conducted in easy-to-understand language without clouding public concerns in some technical 
mumbo-jumbo. A bit of humility on all sides – on the part of gung-ho scientists and self-righteous and scare-
mongering NGOs will help’. 
135  See, for example, the report on the Prajateerpu citizens’ jury in AP (Pimbert and Wakeford 2002), and various 
commentaries by Devinder Sharma reported on the AgBioIndia site. Also see Shah and Bannerji on this theme 
in an op-ed piece for the Hindu (24 August 2002). 
136  ‘IARI shifts attention to export markets’, Financial Express (22 April 2002). 
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 Bringing in multiple expertises in an active inclusionary process, where issues fully deliberated, could 
potentially allow the reframing of the crop biotechnology debate in India to begin to address some of 
these more “front end” issues of technology choice and rural livelihood futures in more concrete ways.  
Yet such debates cannot be conducted in the abstract, out of context. One key lesson of the Bt 
cotton saga, is that states matter and localities are important. Local to global debates reverberate through 
regulatory decision-making. What happens in Haveri in Karnataka may make news through the internet 
services around the world and so impinge on political processes both in Delhi and Bangalore. Assuming 
that regulation – of whatever form whether precautionary or otherwise – emerges from a central, 
technocratically defined national authority is, as we have seen, inadequate. In a large, federal country with 
complex political and other connections between the centre and the states, there are often only very fragile 
threads based on limited networks between central authorities and state level practice. As the “transgenic 
chaos” in Gujarat – repeated elsewhere, although less dramatically – has shown informal markets, astute 
entrepreneurs and farmers demanding effective products combine to undermine any neat, regulatory 
system imposed from elsewhere. Thus regulatory authorities must be embedded locally and have local 
legitimacy, yet must tread the fine line between this and becoming prone to local capture by particular 
interest groups. The Bt cotton story thus highlights one of the key dilemmas of the federal arrangement, 
and a challenge for how to conceive of the state and its regulatory function in the contemporary setting. 
In rethinking regulation, we must also be cognisant of the fact that this setting is not that found forty 
years ago at the height of the Green Revolution. The state does not have the resources or the reach to 
implement complex regulatory frameworks however wonderfully designed. Biotechnology is very much 
part and parcel of the post-reform era, where private investment is seen as key to the success of the 
economy, and science-based technologies, such as GM crops, very much part of the package. In the 
deregulated agricultural supply sector, it must be asked whether regulation is practical at all. Is this not just 
fanciful wishful thinking, harking back to the days when the state could actually do something? That the 
formal regulatory process for the commercial release of Bt cotton was taken over by events, with Bt cotton 
already illegally being farmed over several years by thousands of farmers across a number of states is 
perhaps witness to the impossibility of regulation. And this is with only one product: what about when 
there are many GM crops and traits on the market?  This unregulated free-for-all is feared by many – by 
those who go through the official process only to find their proprietary product being sold illegally; by 
regulators who see their neat and tidy technocratic regulations unravelling before them; and by those 
opposed to GM-crops who see such a scenario as the worst of all worlds. 
That there is some consensus that the unregulated option is undesirable from nearly all major 
protagonists perhaps offers some hope of rescuing the idea of regulation. But the form it will take, if it is 
to have any effect at all, will clearly have to differ from the narrow, technocratic focus employed to date. 
The last eight years have been a test of the state’s capacity, autonomy and commitment to regulation in 
the post-reform context and it has been found wanting on a number of counts. Clearly some opening up 
of the process is required, increased transparency of procedures and information is essential as is a 
recasting of the regulatory remit to a wider set of issues. Moving the regulatory function away from an 
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 implementing department – whether DBT or ICAR – makes sense, as does a broadening of the 
composition of committees and oversight roles. Independence is the key word, and succumbing to the 
pressures of industry for fast-track, one-stop shop options will probably not be in anyone’s interests in the 
long-term. Ensuring that processes are coordinated between the centre and the states is also clearly an 
important factor, so that unnecessary bureaucratic delays are avoided and policy responsiveness at a more 
local level is possible.  
But even this will not be enough. The state – whether central or more locally – does not have the 
capacity. Other tacks will have to be taken, which ensure multiple forms of accountability on the 
regulatory process. One of the important lessons of the past few years is that the contests to the 
regulations – in the media, in the courts, in the streets, or in the rural hinterlands of Karnataka, or indeed 
more discreetly in the informal lobbying of scientists, committee members and others – has ensured 
another set of accountabilities on the regulatory process. As we have seen – however ill-informed or 
misguided that some of these interventions have been – these have affected the way Bt cotton and its 
regulation has been thought about. Such forms of accountability, from outside the science-industry-policy 
networks that make up the core of the regulatory machinery, are essential if biosafety regulations are to 
have any meaning in the contemporary setting. 
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